Investing attracts a lot of smart people. Investors are good with numbers, good with details, and competitive. Many smart investors are on a quest to find the perfect investment or investing style. Until he's surpassed Buffett holds the title of the best investor. He grew almost nothing to a pile of money that makes him one of the richest people in the world. He isn't just rich, he's also considered a sage with people looking to him for life advice alongside of investing advice.
I've held for a long time that the best investment style is Buffett's style if one can replicate it. Whether or not Buffett's style can be successfully replicated is up for debate, but his results are not. He is undeniably the best living investor, and possibly the best investor to have ever lived.
If Buffett is the best then why am I not following his investment style? Why do I invest in a manner that's similar to Benjamin Graham, Buffett's teacher? Graham and others who followed his style had great investing records, but none as great as Buffett. My sense is that many readers don't understand why I would chose to invest in an inferior strategy.
The path most investors take is they start out looking for statistically cheap stocks such as net-nets, low P/B stocks or depressed earners. Then once they've gained some experience they graduate to companies with moats and quality compounders. The Coke's of the world that a buy at any price will result in incredible wealth eventually. It seems to be accepted that investing like Graham is fine for those who are starting out, but all good investors eventually graduate to the big leagues.
Why am I investing in a knowingly inferior strategy when a better one (Buffett investing) is available? The answer is simple, value investing Graham style is 'good enough' for me.
A good friend uses a great analogy to discuss investing. He talks about his portfolio like a hardware store. One one shelf there are hammers, screw drivers, nuts and bolts, ladders and other small items. The owner makes a small margin on each item. They might make a few pennies on each nail sold, but in aggregate the pennies on the nails and dollars on hammers add up to a living for the owner. In contrast a Buffett style investor is like someone who owns a Maserati dealership. Not many cars are sold, or need to be sold, but the dealer makes a larger profit on each transaction. The Maserati dealer is mostly sitting on their hands, and one can say removes ignorance by sticking to only the best cars.
There isn't much pride in owning a hardware store. The store provides a living, but doesn't provide great conversation at a cocktail party. Owning a Maserati dealership is quite different, the owner is probably wealthy and their cars are always great topics for parties.
This analogy works well on many different levels. The hardware store owner is like a Graham investor. There is no pride in owning many different types of stocks that no one has heard of. But in aggregate buying cheap stocks below book value, or NCAV, selling once appreciated and repeating provides a living. At a party not many people are going to know who Decker Manufacturing, Conduril or West End Indiana Bank are. Buffett investors have a remarkably different experience, their portfolios are much more party topic worthy. There's a pride in owning stocks that rise 5x or 10x. No one wants to hear about little companies that can be churned for 50% gains, people want to hear about the big winners.
The hardware store owner isn't going to earn as much as the Maserati dealer, likewise a Graham investor probably won't ever be as successful as someone who can invest like Buffett. An obvious question is if someone had the ability to own either the hardware store, or the dealership why would they pick the hardware store? That same question can be asked about the two investing styles.
There is a cost to each style of investing, the cost is the time to research, the time to follow companies, and the emotional energy required to implement each strategy. The cost is less to invest in a manner similar to Graham. There are many companies that I've found, researched and invested in where the time I devoted to do so was less than two hours. Many of my holdings require an hour to an hour and a half of time annually to stay up to date.
Buffett's style of investing requires obsession. He is consumed with investing, he lives and breathes it and has since he started. It took priority in his marriage, in his relationship with his children, and with anything else in his life, investing is number one. The results of this obsession are apparent, he's become the most successful investor. I see this same level of obsession with many who are following in his path. On the Corner of Berkshire and Fairfax message board there are threads detailing Buffett-style companies that stretch into the hundreds of pages. Seemingly every possibly piece of legal information is rendered useful and important to the investment thesis of these sorts of companies.
I don't have the time or ability to become obsessed about my investments. I have a family, have a job, have a business and have lots of other activities that I enjoy outside of investing. In a lot of ways Graham's departure from the investing world later in life is attractive. He had enough money to pursue other interests that had his attention, didn't need more success, or more money, he had enough. I enjoy looking at companies and researching investments, but I also enjoy doing other things too. I enjoy playing with my kids on a warm summer after in the backyard. Time like that is priceless, is giving that up worth it for another 2/3/5% increase in my portfolio?
When I survey the value investing landscape Graham's methods are attractive. Over the long term they beat the market and reduce risk (the risk of permanent loss of capital). They aren't glamorous, but they work. When I look at my own needs, both monetary, and otherwise I realize that finding the best investment strategy isn't important. If over the next 30 years the market returns 10% annualized and I can earn 10-15% investing on my own I will have more than enough. It's possible that if I were to graduate to Buffett's style of investing that maybe I could do 15%+ annualized. I am not investing to impress anyone, and if what's considered beginner value investing achieves my goals why graduate to something more complicated?
Like a hardware store owner who might decide to own the store because of the hours, the location, or the speed of life, I've made a similar choice with investing. I've taken a path that might not be the best possible, but it's good enough. Over the long term I believe I'll have acceptable above market returns, but will also have time for life outside of investing. Because of this choice I'll probably never enter the world of the super rich, but that's something I'm alright with.
In the end I've chosen a good enough investing style, but not the best.
The fallacy of the "best idea".
There is an idea floating around in the value investing world that investors should only purchase their five or ten best ideas. The idea is that if a stock being considered for a portfolio isn't as good as the 'best idea' then why buy something sub-par? Instead investors should continue to pile into their best idea instead of finding new ideas.
The best idea line of thinking gets a lot of traction and has become incredibly popular after the 2009 market recovery where concentrated investors have trounced the market. Investors are always chasing the best strategy and seeing as how concentrated investing has done so well recently it's no surprise that it's the strategy du jour. I've posted in the past regarding my thoughts on diversification, and this post isn't intended to re-hash those thoughts.
I've always thought that there's a disconnect between academic investing and real world investing. In an academic study an investor has a starting point, they pick a portfolio of some number of stocks according to specific criteria and then their performance is measured against a benchmark for a limited time range. A study like this is intended to show how specific criteria, or a style of investing matches up against the market, with the market being the control group. Numerous academic studies have shown that low-anything (P/B, EV/EBITDA,P/S,P/E) investing works. An investor who purchases something for less than a chosen average metric and holds for a period of time will do better on average compared to an investor who purchases the market.
From these studies the notion that value investing, momentum investing, small stock investing beat the market is established. The concept of value investing as defined through academic literature, or investment classics like like Security Analysis or the Intelligent Investor are usually the starting point for an investor defining their strategy. There is a natural inclination in all of us to take something that works and think about how it can be improved. We look at a study that shows buying all low-P/B stocks and think "what if I could remove the obvious duds, then I'd do better."
The idea of investing in a few best ideas is simply an extension of this concept. What starts as investing in all low P/B stocks turns into only investing in the 'best' low P/B stocks, which leads to investing in only the 'best' cheap stocks. On paper this makes perfect sense, it's intuitive. It's been reinforced by the bull market coming out of 2009 where every concentrated investor has killed the market by investing in the best turnarounds.
Within this environment I'm asked continually why I'm diluting my portfolio by investing in my 10th idea or my 30th idea or my 50th idea.
I believe there are two problems with the best idea type of thinking: portfolios are built over time, and we don't know our best idea.
Not many investors start with a blank slate. A new fund manager might start with a pile of cash that needs to be invested in a portfolio, but most managers start gradually as well as funding is received. Individual investors create a portfolio through savings over time. A portfolio is built over time, not in a single day. During the building period new is released about holdings and prices are continuously changing. What was the best idea initially might become a mediocre idea after a news release. Or the best idea might experience a run-up that leaves it much less attractive.
The investment landscape is always changing, it's foolish to think that on the day one sits down to create their portfolio they will have they will already have their best idea. Some investors go years ambling along before they find an idea that multiplies their portfolio many times over. Other investors never hit it out of the ballpark, but consistently do well with most investments. If the best idea isn't known on day one then what's an investor to do when they find this new best investment? Should they sell everything and concentrate their entire portfolio in it? Logic would say if you find a true best investment you should concentrate everything in it. Why dilute your best idea with your second best idea?
The problem is we don't truly know our best ideas, even if we think we do. Some ideas resemble situations that worked out well in the past, but there is no guarantee that they'll work well in the future. There are no situations where one can be absolutely certain about an outcome. Even an executive guiding their company through a merger isn't certain until the deal closes, the other party could pull out at the last minute. There is always an element of chance involved in any and all investments. We all know this, and this is why we don't see investors with one stock portfolios. Of course there are exceptions, there are some super human investors who can pick five stocks that all triple and crush the market. I don't know if they have a crystal ball or if they're just that much smarter, but they do exist. The question one needs to ask themselves is whether they have that crystal ball ability. I know I don't, and most probably don't either. I know it's fun to think we're all above average, but math doesn't allow that.
When I say I don't know my best idea what a lot of people hear is "I don't know a good idea from a bad idea, they all look the same to me." There is a subtle nuance here that needs to be clarified. A company with high returns on equity selling at a low price has the potential to generate better returns compared to a net-net at 2/3 of NCAV over the long term, I know this. When I say we don't know our best idea I mean we don't know what idea will perform the best. It's possible a net-net will turn itself around and come roaring back with a magnificent gain. On the other hand a great company with an indelible brand such as Coke could become yesterday's value if attitudes turn against sugary drinks and consumption drops.
Here's an exercise, go back through your portfolio statements from previous years and mark down what you thought was the best idea at the time. Of those best ideas how many worked out exactly as you expected? If the number is 70-80% then you should probably be concentrating in half a dozen stocks or less. But if your ability to predict the future isn't that high then it's worth broadening up the portfolio and start hitting singles and doubles instead of gunning for home runs. When I look at my portfolio I have had many companies I thought were potential rockets that did nothing, and other companies that were just simply cheap go on to double or triple. It's much more common that I had a plain undervalued stock double rather than some turnaround story stock with a catalyst quadruple. I find it easier to find stocks that are likely to gain 50-100% rather than finding ones that will return 400%.
I like to minimize the number of assumptions or moving parts necessary for a thesis to work. A healthy company with an extremely low valuation is easier to purchase compared to a 'good' company at a reasonable valuation. The low valued company just needs to survive long enough for their market value to correct, the good company needs to continue to execute at a high level without making mistakes to hold up their valuation.
For more ideas on how portfolio management fits into my overall investing system, go here.
The best idea line of thinking gets a lot of traction and has become incredibly popular after the 2009 market recovery where concentrated investors have trounced the market. Investors are always chasing the best strategy and seeing as how concentrated investing has done so well recently it's no surprise that it's the strategy du jour. I've posted in the past regarding my thoughts on diversification, and this post isn't intended to re-hash those thoughts.
I've always thought that there's a disconnect between academic investing and real world investing. In an academic study an investor has a starting point, they pick a portfolio of some number of stocks according to specific criteria and then their performance is measured against a benchmark for a limited time range. A study like this is intended to show how specific criteria, or a style of investing matches up against the market, with the market being the control group. Numerous academic studies have shown that low-anything (P/B, EV/EBITDA,P/S,P/E) investing works. An investor who purchases something for less than a chosen average metric and holds for a period of time will do better on average compared to an investor who purchases the market.
From these studies the notion that value investing, momentum investing, small stock investing beat the market is established. The concept of value investing as defined through academic literature, or investment classics like like Security Analysis or the Intelligent Investor are usually the starting point for an investor defining their strategy. There is a natural inclination in all of us to take something that works and think about how it can be improved. We look at a study that shows buying all low-P/B stocks and think "what if I could remove the obvious duds, then I'd do better."
The idea of investing in a few best ideas is simply an extension of this concept. What starts as investing in all low P/B stocks turns into only investing in the 'best' low P/B stocks, which leads to investing in only the 'best' cheap stocks. On paper this makes perfect sense, it's intuitive. It's been reinforced by the bull market coming out of 2009 where every concentrated investor has killed the market by investing in the best turnarounds.
Within this environment I'm asked continually why I'm diluting my portfolio by investing in my 10th idea or my 30th idea or my 50th idea.
I believe there are two problems with the best idea type of thinking: portfolios are built over time, and we don't know our best idea.
Not many investors start with a blank slate. A new fund manager might start with a pile of cash that needs to be invested in a portfolio, but most managers start gradually as well as funding is received. Individual investors create a portfolio through savings over time. A portfolio is built over time, not in a single day. During the building period new is released about holdings and prices are continuously changing. What was the best idea initially might become a mediocre idea after a news release. Or the best idea might experience a run-up that leaves it much less attractive.
The investment landscape is always changing, it's foolish to think that on the day one sits down to create their portfolio they will have they will already have their best idea. Some investors go years ambling along before they find an idea that multiplies their portfolio many times over. Other investors never hit it out of the ballpark, but consistently do well with most investments. If the best idea isn't known on day one then what's an investor to do when they find this new best investment? Should they sell everything and concentrate their entire portfolio in it? Logic would say if you find a true best investment you should concentrate everything in it. Why dilute your best idea with your second best idea?
The problem is we don't truly know our best ideas, even if we think we do. Some ideas resemble situations that worked out well in the past, but there is no guarantee that they'll work well in the future. There are no situations where one can be absolutely certain about an outcome. Even an executive guiding their company through a merger isn't certain until the deal closes, the other party could pull out at the last minute. There is always an element of chance involved in any and all investments. We all know this, and this is why we don't see investors with one stock portfolios. Of course there are exceptions, there are some super human investors who can pick five stocks that all triple and crush the market. I don't know if they have a crystal ball or if they're just that much smarter, but they do exist. The question one needs to ask themselves is whether they have that crystal ball ability. I know I don't, and most probably don't either. I know it's fun to think we're all above average, but math doesn't allow that.
When I say I don't know my best idea what a lot of people hear is "I don't know a good idea from a bad idea, they all look the same to me." There is a subtle nuance here that needs to be clarified. A company with high returns on equity selling at a low price has the potential to generate better returns compared to a net-net at 2/3 of NCAV over the long term, I know this. When I say we don't know our best idea I mean we don't know what idea will perform the best. It's possible a net-net will turn itself around and come roaring back with a magnificent gain. On the other hand a great company with an indelible brand such as Coke could become yesterday's value if attitudes turn against sugary drinks and consumption drops.
Here's an exercise, go back through your portfolio statements from previous years and mark down what you thought was the best idea at the time. Of those best ideas how many worked out exactly as you expected? If the number is 70-80% then you should probably be concentrating in half a dozen stocks or less. But if your ability to predict the future isn't that high then it's worth broadening up the portfolio and start hitting singles and doubles instead of gunning for home runs. When I look at my portfolio I have had many companies I thought were potential rockets that did nothing, and other companies that were just simply cheap go on to double or triple. It's much more common that I had a plain undervalued stock double rather than some turnaround story stock with a catalyst quadruple. I find it easier to find stocks that are likely to gain 50-100% rather than finding ones that will return 400%.
I like to minimize the number of assumptions or moving parts necessary for a thesis to work. A healthy company with an extremely low valuation is easier to purchase compared to a 'good' company at a reasonable valuation. The low valued company just needs to survive long enough for their market value to correct, the good company needs to continue to execute at a high level without making mistakes to hold up their valuation.
For more ideas on how portfolio management fits into my overall investing system, go here.
Calling all growth investors a 24% ROE at 5x earnings; Trius Investments
Sometimes the strangest collections of assets can yield incredible hidden value. Little collections of assets are also interesting to research, it's like trying to put the pieces of a puzzle together. I've found that as I leave the major exchanges, and drift down in market cap the collections of assets can become bizarre, which is the case for Trius Investments (TRU.Canada).
Trius Investments calls themselves an investment holding company, which is approximately right. This is because at one point they had lofty ambitions of being a hedge fund, a venture that eventually fizzled. They currently own a garbage collection company and investment interests in drug rehab clinics. Their garbage collection business is named Trius Disposal and operates in municipalities located throughout New Brunswick.
The company owns both the garbage trucks and the trash cans that customers use. Customers rent the trash cans from the company, an arrangement that reminds me of how AT&T used to rent phones to customers. Garbage cans can be rented for $5.69/mo or $64.40 a year, or they can be purchased outright for $184-240. Considering I just purchased a trash can at Home Depot that looks similar to theirs for $24.99 I think these prices are crazy, but maybe they're just charging what the market will bear. The company claims their competitive advantage is operating at a lower cost through the use of automated trucks. I appreciate this narrative, but I don't understand why competing companies don't buy the same trucks.
Trius' other major asset are their investments in a number of Recovery Ways drug rehab clinics throughout the US. Trius owns ownership interests in the buildings that the clinics rent. The rental income has provided a significant boost to earnings and has fueled the company's growth.
Both of the company's investments are stable and non-cyclical. Homeowners will always need their trash picked up, and drug use doesn't appear to be on the decline either.
The company's results are phenomenal. Since 2008 they have grown book value from $1.05m to $3.9m today. The majority of this growth is a result of their real estate investments. The company's earnings have grown from $0.009 per share in 2008 to $.0794 per share at the end of last year. The company trades for $.395 or about 5 times earnings. Their financial results are shown below:
After looking at the company's results I found it hard to believe that a company with such strong earnings growth and a high ROE was trading for such a low multiple.
A common explanation for the low multiple might be that the market doesn't expect the company's earnings to hold up in the future. This theory might even be believed when looking at first quarter results, which are trended lower than last year. I don't believe that's the case because the company stated that their results were affected by the timing of a distribution from their real estate holdings. Last year the distribution was received in the first quarter, and this year it was received in April. A second plausible explanation might be that the company is small and trading is limited. I don't believe that's a reasonable explanation either, there are many small and illiquid companies selling for fair value or above. Simply being small doesn't guarantee an undervaluation.
I believe the reason this is trading for such a low price is because investors are worried about what management might do. The company is run by Gordon Wheaton who founded the company in 1972. He founded Trius Inc (note the difference in name) as a three car taxi company. The taxi company was eventually sold and Wheaton diversified into charter busses, garbage collection, a package delivery company, car care, and a truck rental business. All of these investments are held under the Trius Inc company which is private and still held by Wheaton.
It's unclear why Wheaton decided to list his disposal business publicly. But one thing is clear, he has profited from it. Since 2005 he has done private placements and distributed options as prices far below the market price at the time of issuance. By doing so he has enriched himself at the expense of shareholders. The company doesn't pay a dividend either, so shareholders need to rely on price appreciation alone.
The CEO appears to be running the Trius Investments as his private company. This shouldn't be a surprise considering he has a collection of small little businesses that he owns outside of Trius Investments. It's unclear where his focus is too. He has a Twitter account where he posts fuel prices for his service station. I can't remember the last time I thought to check Twitter to find out who's gas prices were 1 cent cheaper, but it seems like a few people do.
I recently wrote a post on where I discussed the risks related to owning closely held companies, I kept thinking about that post as I researched Trius. I desperately want to like Trius Investments, I have a feeling this company will continue to grow. Yet I continued to remind myself of the lessons from the post. Trius Investments appears to be run for the benefit of the owner and shareholders can tag along for as long as Wheaton allows it. Sometimes it's alright to tag along if there's a chance the company could be sold for a far greater price in the future. Instead Wheaton appears to be taking advantage of the public market to acquire more of the company for himself at below market prices. A sale to an outside party is unlikely, what's more likely is the company goes private at a low valuation.
For investors with a strong stomach for management risk, or those who've seen something like this before and had it work out Trius Investments might be a great purchase here. For myself I'm going to pass.
Disclosure: No position
Trius Investments calls themselves an investment holding company, which is approximately right. This is because at one point they had lofty ambitions of being a hedge fund, a venture that eventually fizzled. They currently own a garbage collection company and investment interests in drug rehab clinics. Their garbage collection business is named Trius Disposal and operates in municipalities located throughout New Brunswick.
The company owns both the garbage trucks and the trash cans that customers use. Customers rent the trash cans from the company, an arrangement that reminds me of how AT&T used to rent phones to customers. Garbage cans can be rented for $5.69/mo or $64.40 a year, or they can be purchased outright for $184-240. Considering I just purchased a trash can at Home Depot that looks similar to theirs for $24.99 I think these prices are crazy, but maybe they're just charging what the market will bear. The company claims their competitive advantage is operating at a lower cost through the use of automated trucks. I appreciate this narrative, but I don't understand why competing companies don't buy the same trucks.
Trius' other major asset are their investments in a number of Recovery Ways drug rehab clinics throughout the US. Trius owns ownership interests in the buildings that the clinics rent. The rental income has provided a significant boost to earnings and has fueled the company's growth.
Both of the company's investments are stable and non-cyclical. Homeowners will always need their trash picked up, and drug use doesn't appear to be on the decline either.
The company's results are phenomenal. Since 2008 they have grown book value from $1.05m to $3.9m today. The majority of this growth is a result of their real estate investments. The company's earnings have grown from $0.009 per share in 2008 to $.0794 per share at the end of last year. The company trades for $.395 or about 5 times earnings. Their financial results are shown below:
A common explanation for the low multiple might be that the market doesn't expect the company's earnings to hold up in the future. This theory might even be believed when looking at first quarter results, which are trended lower than last year. I don't believe that's the case because the company stated that their results were affected by the timing of a distribution from their real estate holdings. Last year the distribution was received in the first quarter, and this year it was received in April. A second plausible explanation might be that the company is small and trading is limited. I don't believe that's a reasonable explanation either, there are many small and illiquid companies selling for fair value or above. Simply being small doesn't guarantee an undervaluation.
I believe the reason this is trading for such a low price is because investors are worried about what management might do. The company is run by Gordon Wheaton who founded the company in 1972. He founded Trius Inc (note the difference in name) as a three car taxi company. The taxi company was eventually sold and Wheaton diversified into charter busses, garbage collection, a package delivery company, car care, and a truck rental business. All of these investments are held under the Trius Inc company which is private and still held by Wheaton.
It's unclear why Wheaton decided to list his disposal business publicly. But one thing is clear, he has profited from it. Since 2005 he has done private placements and distributed options as prices far below the market price at the time of issuance. By doing so he has enriched himself at the expense of shareholders. The company doesn't pay a dividend either, so shareholders need to rely on price appreciation alone.
The CEO appears to be running the Trius Investments as his private company. This shouldn't be a surprise considering he has a collection of small little businesses that he owns outside of Trius Investments. It's unclear where his focus is too. He has a Twitter account where he posts fuel prices for his service station. I can't remember the last time I thought to check Twitter to find out who's gas prices were 1 cent cheaper, but it seems like a few people do.
I recently wrote a post on where I discussed the risks related to owning closely held companies, I kept thinking about that post as I researched Trius. I desperately want to like Trius Investments, I have a feeling this company will continue to grow. Yet I continued to remind myself of the lessons from the post. Trius Investments appears to be run for the benefit of the owner and shareholders can tag along for as long as Wheaton allows it. Sometimes it's alright to tag along if there's a chance the company could be sold for a far greater price in the future. Instead Wheaton appears to be taking advantage of the public market to acquire more of the company for himself at below market prices. A sale to an outside party is unlikely, what's more likely is the company goes private at a low valuation.
For investors with a strong stomach for management risk, or those who've seen something like this before and had it work out Trius Investments might be a great purchase here. For myself I'm going to pass.
Disclosure: No position
Bank balance sheets are not black boxes: AMB Financial
A bank's source of a strength can also be a source of doubt or weakness; their balance sheet. A bank's balance sheet is their most important financial statement. A bank makes or loses money via their balance sheet. If they have a poor balance sheet they won't generate earnings, a strong balance sheet translates into a strong earning stream.
A criticism many investors have of banks is that bank balance sheets are "black boxes" and that it's hard to value a black box. This criticism is true for the large money center banks with trading operations and portfolios of derivatives, but I don't believe it applies to community banks. The stereotype of black box balance sheets is unfortunately applied across the entire banking sector. Not only do I think community bank balance sheets aren't black boxes, I would go further and say they are much more transparent than most non-bank balance sheets.
As outside investors we have to take the financial statements presented to us on faith. If a company says they spend $1.2m on capex we have to trust management's judgement that the company will earn a return with the equipment purchase, and that the money was spent wisely. If a company claims their property is worth $30m we have to take that on faith. An outside investor will always be at a disadvantage regarding the true value of a company's assets. We can't conduct a full audit of everything a company owns. We can obtain what we think is a close proxy for value using heuristics, but we can never know the true value unless management conducts a full audit themselves and releases the value to the public.
My own belief is that there is more of a "black box" component to industrial balance sheets when compared to bank balance sheets. How do we know that a parcel of land held at cost is really worth it's stated value? Or how do we know that a company's capex went into purchasing long lived equipment that will generate returns? How do we know a company is prudently managing their purchases? Business is built on relationships, a company could be purchasing items at a higher cost from suppliers because they've had relationships for years. If so then shareholders lose out. We also don't know the condition of a company's equipment or property. Maybe management is willing to give shareholders a tour, but even still shareholders only see what management wants to show them. It's not uncommon for investors to be led on a dog and pony show through a facility. Even more common is when management shows off their newest facility completely ignoring their old plant and equipment ignoring their old facilities. Do those old facilities have any value?
There are three ways to assess the quality of a balance sheet, through a third party sale, through an audit, or through returns it generates. When a company sells itself in most cases the acquiring company pays fair value. Through the sale to a third party a company's balance sheet value can be unlocked. The second way a company's balance sheet value can be revealed is through an audit. Some companies with extensive supplemental holdings conduct asset audits from time to time and publish their results. Often the audited value and balance sheet value differ dramatically, which is why management conducts the audit. The last way to assess the value of a company's assets are through their returns. If a company has a significant asset base that is barely generating earnings it's likely the assets are underutilized. If a company is earning phenomenal returns on their assets it's likely the assets aren't recorded at their current value.
All of this brings us to bank balance sheets. Much of a bank's balance sheet is transparent, it usually consists of securities, cash, loans, and real estate (both branches and OREO). Of those components most are marked to market. Even loans held to maturity are marked to market if you consider the value of the portfolio and their allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL) as one unit. I say that held to maturity loans are marked to market because a bank has to continually adjust their ALLL depending on the condition of their loans. If the quality of their loans improves their ALLL shrinks, if the quality deteriorates their ALLL increases. By monitoring a bank's ALLL investors can get a sense to the true value of a bank's loan portfolio.
Unlike industrial companies banks are regulated by a regulator who is supposed to ensure that a bank is well reserved for losses and is not engaged in any risky lending. In other words the regulator's job is to protect the value of the bank's balance sheet. Regulators aren't perfect, no human is. Some investors like to pin the blame for the financial crisis on the backs of regulators, and others claim the system wouldn't work without them. In my view the truth is in the middle. On the whole the existence of regulators gives investors better information from which they can make decisions.
My own belief is that a bank with a strong balance sheet has value regardless of whether the current management can generate a return with it. This is especially true in banking where regulatory and market forces push underperforming banks to merge with stronger banks. Regulators, and bank activists are powerful catalysts unlocking value for shareholders.
All of this leads to the bank I want to talk about, AMB Financial (AMFC). AMB Financial is the holding company for American Savings FSB in Munster, Indiana. Even though the bank has an Indiana address they're more appropriately viewed as a Chicago bank. The bank is located less than a mile from the Illinois border in the Indiana suburbs south of Chicago.
AMB Financial is as plain and vanilla as community banks come. They have a sound balance sheet comprised of deposits and loans from which they generate ample interest income. The bank is small with only $135m in loans, $8m in mortgage backed securities and $13m in cash. They are funded with deposits and a small amount of borrowing.
The bank is cheap too, they're selling for 61% of tangible book value. This is especially low for a profitable bank. They earned $.66 per share last year, and in the first quarter of 2014 they earned $.21 per share. Banking isn't seasonal, and their quarterly income isn't from a loan loss reversal, so it's likely they could earn $.84 per share this fiscal year barring any issues.
Like most banks in the US AMB Financial's non-performing assets peaked in the 2009/2010 time frame and have been declining since. They have about $5.2m in classified assets and a loan loss reserve of $1.7m. The bank is well capitalized with a 15% Tier 1 ratio and tangible equity/total assets of 7.2%.
There are a number of reasons investors would avoid the bank, let me try to encapsulate all of them in one sentence. They are too small, don't earn a high enough ROE, have too high of an efficiency ratio, don't have a great deposit market share, have preferred stock, are illiquid, aren't growing, aren't Wells Fargo. Despite all of this the fact remains, this is a cheap and profitable bank. If this bank were trading at 1.5x TBV I wouldn't be interested in the stock, but at 61% of TBV I think they're attractive. I have a large portion of my portfolio set aside for banks such as this. I buy my cheap banks in bulk, most positions are small, but in aggregate they're significant.
Disclosure: Long AMFC
A criticism many investors have of banks is that bank balance sheets are "black boxes" and that it's hard to value a black box. This criticism is true for the large money center banks with trading operations and portfolios of derivatives, but I don't believe it applies to community banks. The stereotype of black box balance sheets is unfortunately applied across the entire banking sector. Not only do I think community bank balance sheets aren't black boxes, I would go further and say they are much more transparent than most non-bank balance sheets.
As outside investors we have to take the financial statements presented to us on faith. If a company says they spend $1.2m on capex we have to trust management's judgement that the company will earn a return with the equipment purchase, and that the money was spent wisely. If a company claims their property is worth $30m we have to take that on faith. An outside investor will always be at a disadvantage regarding the true value of a company's assets. We can't conduct a full audit of everything a company owns. We can obtain what we think is a close proxy for value using heuristics, but we can never know the true value unless management conducts a full audit themselves and releases the value to the public.
My own belief is that there is more of a "black box" component to industrial balance sheets when compared to bank balance sheets. How do we know that a parcel of land held at cost is really worth it's stated value? Or how do we know that a company's capex went into purchasing long lived equipment that will generate returns? How do we know a company is prudently managing their purchases? Business is built on relationships, a company could be purchasing items at a higher cost from suppliers because they've had relationships for years. If so then shareholders lose out. We also don't know the condition of a company's equipment or property. Maybe management is willing to give shareholders a tour, but even still shareholders only see what management wants to show them. It's not uncommon for investors to be led on a dog and pony show through a facility. Even more common is when management shows off their newest facility completely ignoring their old plant and equipment ignoring their old facilities. Do those old facilities have any value?
There are three ways to assess the quality of a balance sheet, through a third party sale, through an audit, or through returns it generates. When a company sells itself in most cases the acquiring company pays fair value. Through the sale to a third party a company's balance sheet value can be unlocked. The second way a company's balance sheet value can be revealed is through an audit. Some companies with extensive supplemental holdings conduct asset audits from time to time and publish their results. Often the audited value and balance sheet value differ dramatically, which is why management conducts the audit. The last way to assess the value of a company's assets are through their returns. If a company has a significant asset base that is barely generating earnings it's likely the assets are underutilized. If a company is earning phenomenal returns on their assets it's likely the assets aren't recorded at their current value.
All of this brings us to bank balance sheets. Much of a bank's balance sheet is transparent, it usually consists of securities, cash, loans, and real estate (both branches and OREO). Of those components most are marked to market. Even loans held to maturity are marked to market if you consider the value of the portfolio and their allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL) as one unit. I say that held to maturity loans are marked to market because a bank has to continually adjust their ALLL depending on the condition of their loans. If the quality of their loans improves their ALLL shrinks, if the quality deteriorates their ALLL increases. By monitoring a bank's ALLL investors can get a sense to the true value of a bank's loan portfolio.
Unlike industrial companies banks are regulated by a regulator who is supposed to ensure that a bank is well reserved for losses and is not engaged in any risky lending. In other words the regulator's job is to protect the value of the bank's balance sheet. Regulators aren't perfect, no human is. Some investors like to pin the blame for the financial crisis on the backs of regulators, and others claim the system wouldn't work without them. In my view the truth is in the middle. On the whole the existence of regulators gives investors better information from which they can make decisions.
My own belief is that a bank with a strong balance sheet has value regardless of whether the current management can generate a return with it. This is especially true in banking where regulatory and market forces push underperforming banks to merge with stronger banks. Regulators, and bank activists are powerful catalysts unlocking value for shareholders.
All of this leads to the bank I want to talk about, AMB Financial (AMFC). AMB Financial is the holding company for American Savings FSB in Munster, Indiana. Even though the bank has an Indiana address they're more appropriately viewed as a Chicago bank. The bank is located less than a mile from the Illinois border in the Indiana suburbs south of Chicago.
AMB Financial is as plain and vanilla as community banks come. They have a sound balance sheet comprised of deposits and loans from which they generate ample interest income. The bank is small with only $135m in loans, $8m in mortgage backed securities and $13m in cash. They are funded with deposits and a small amount of borrowing.
The bank is cheap too, they're selling for 61% of tangible book value. This is especially low for a profitable bank. They earned $.66 per share last year, and in the first quarter of 2014 they earned $.21 per share. Banking isn't seasonal, and their quarterly income isn't from a loan loss reversal, so it's likely they could earn $.84 per share this fiscal year barring any issues.
Like most banks in the US AMB Financial's non-performing assets peaked in the 2009/2010 time frame and have been declining since. They have about $5.2m in classified assets and a loan loss reserve of $1.7m. The bank is well capitalized with a 15% Tier 1 ratio and tangible equity/total assets of 7.2%.
There are a number of reasons investors would avoid the bank, let me try to encapsulate all of them in one sentence. They are too small, don't earn a high enough ROE, have too high of an efficiency ratio, don't have a great deposit market share, have preferred stock, are illiquid, aren't growing, aren't Wells Fargo. Despite all of this the fact remains, this is a cheap and profitable bank. If this bank were trading at 1.5x TBV I wouldn't be interested in the stock, but at 61% of TBV I think they're attractive. I have a large portion of my portfolio set aside for banks such as this. I buy my cheap banks in bulk, most positions are small, but in aggregate they're significant.
Disclosure: Long AMFC
The risk with owning closely held companies
One of the hallmarks of my investing style is that I usually invest in closely held companies. A closely held company is one where a shareholder, often a founder, or founding family owns a controlling stake. The idea is that with a closely held companies minority shareholder interests are aligned with the controlling holder's interests. There is a lot of research to back up this assertion and shows that family owned and closely controlled companies have outperformed the market over the long term. But long term outperformance doesn't mean there won't be a few duds along the way. While it's always nice to talk about and tout investment successes I think it's also important to look at our failures as well.
I wrote about First Aviation (FAVS) in last March. When I found them they were selling an unprofitable division for more than their current market cap. I've found that investments like that often end successfully. This is mostly because the profitable division's hidden value is exposed to investors. The company also has proceeds from the sale that can be used to fortify their balance sheet. When an investor can purchase a company for less than the proceeds from the sale and get a profitable business for "free" it makes sense to invest.
What took place at First Aviation didn't quite follow usual the divest your way to profits playbook. The company is an aviation parts supplier and outsourced maintenance vendor. They specialize in commercial propellor planes, the ones that are used on short haul commercial flights. The company's majority shareholder is an aviation focused private equity group located in Connecticut. I mention the location on purpose, the aviation company's facilities are in North Carolina, Wichita, and Texas. Yet the company leases their office space from the private equity group's headquarters. This was an item that gave me a bit of caution, but wasn't enough of a red flag to pass on the investment. It's hard for executives to manage a company remotely.
In the last year the company has done exactly what it said it would do, they used the proceeds from their division sale to pay down debt and their profitable division's profits have grown nicely. The company reported earnings last week where they reported they earned $.32 in the first quarter. Extrapolated out for the year the company could earn $1.20 a share or more, significant considering their shares trade at $8.40. They aren't only cheap on an earnings basis, they also trade for 68% of a growing book value.
The problem is shareholders aren't going to be the beneficiaries of this growth story. Management decided they'd prefer to take the company private by engaging in a 10,000 for 1 reverse stock split. Any shareholder who owns less than $84,000 worth of stock will be forced out of their shares and paid $8.40 per share in cash. The 10,000 share limit is significant in that it's a much higher amount than normal for a reverse merger. Most likely the company is squeezing out all but a few large shareholders by setting such a high threshold. The company is already a non-SEC reporting entity meaning they have less than 300 shareholders of record. This corporate action isn't an effort to stop filing and reduce costs, it's a way to eliminate all but larger shareholders.
When I purchased the stock shares were priced at $9, so this take-under won't be a huge loss, but it's still a loss. What hurts most about this transaction is that my initial thesis was, and still is correct. I would classify First Aviation as an investment failure, but not an investment mistake.
Unfortunately in the case of First Aviation having a significant controlling shareholder didn't help minority shareholders, it hurt them. I suspect this is because the majority holder is a private equity group who is only watching out for themselves and their (the PE investors) shareholders, not everyone. Private equity doesn't have a great reputation for being shareholder friendly. At times investors can profit investing alongside private equity firms, but it's not a relationship of equals. It's more like the minority shareholder is the bird riding on the rhinoceros' back. You can get a free ride, but if you're in the wrong spot you're likely to be crushed without regard.
I think it makes sense in response to this investment failure to consider whether I'd do anything differently? I'm not sure I would. If this company weren't going private I'd be happy to be a buyer at this price today, especially with how their results have improved. The lesson I've taken away from this investment is that even when everything works out according to a plan it's still possible to experience an investment loss. The problem is as a minority shareholder I am tagging along on all of my investments. I can't control what a company's management does to outside shareholders. If management decides to take action which is detrimental to shareholders I can experience a loss even if my investment thesis is correct.
My experience with First Aviation has made me wary of the recent news out on Schuff Steel, a company I wrote about in 2012. The Schuff family sold their controlling stake to a private equity group. Schuff has the potential to play out in a manner that's similar to First Aviation. The company's results have been recovering dramatically but it's possible outside minority shareholders won't get to enjoy the reward associated with the results.
Disclosure: Long FAVS, SHFK
I wrote about First Aviation (FAVS) in last March. When I found them they were selling an unprofitable division for more than their current market cap. I've found that investments like that often end successfully. This is mostly because the profitable division's hidden value is exposed to investors. The company also has proceeds from the sale that can be used to fortify their balance sheet. When an investor can purchase a company for less than the proceeds from the sale and get a profitable business for "free" it makes sense to invest.
What took place at First Aviation didn't quite follow usual the divest your way to profits playbook. The company is an aviation parts supplier and outsourced maintenance vendor. They specialize in commercial propellor planes, the ones that are used on short haul commercial flights. The company's majority shareholder is an aviation focused private equity group located in Connecticut. I mention the location on purpose, the aviation company's facilities are in North Carolina, Wichita, and Texas. Yet the company leases their office space from the private equity group's headquarters. This was an item that gave me a bit of caution, but wasn't enough of a red flag to pass on the investment. It's hard for executives to manage a company remotely.
In the last year the company has done exactly what it said it would do, they used the proceeds from their division sale to pay down debt and their profitable division's profits have grown nicely. The company reported earnings last week where they reported they earned $.32 in the first quarter. Extrapolated out for the year the company could earn $1.20 a share or more, significant considering their shares trade at $8.40. They aren't only cheap on an earnings basis, they also trade for 68% of a growing book value.
The problem is shareholders aren't going to be the beneficiaries of this growth story. Management decided they'd prefer to take the company private by engaging in a 10,000 for 1 reverse stock split. Any shareholder who owns less than $84,000 worth of stock will be forced out of their shares and paid $8.40 per share in cash. The 10,000 share limit is significant in that it's a much higher amount than normal for a reverse merger. Most likely the company is squeezing out all but a few large shareholders by setting such a high threshold. The company is already a non-SEC reporting entity meaning they have less than 300 shareholders of record. This corporate action isn't an effort to stop filing and reduce costs, it's a way to eliminate all but larger shareholders.
When I purchased the stock shares were priced at $9, so this take-under won't be a huge loss, but it's still a loss. What hurts most about this transaction is that my initial thesis was, and still is correct. I would classify First Aviation as an investment failure, but not an investment mistake.
Unfortunately in the case of First Aviation having a significant controlling shareholder didn't help minority shareholders, it hurt them. I suspect this is because the majority holder is a private equity group who is only watching out for themselves and their (the PE investors) shareholders, not everyone. Private equity doesn't have a great reputation for being shareholder friendly. At times investors can profit investing alongside private equity firms, but it's not a relationship of equals. It's more like the minority shareholder is the bird riding on the rhinoceros' back. You can get a free ride, but if you're in the wrong spot you're likely to be crushed without regard.
I think it makes sense in response to this investment failure to consider whether I'd do anything differently? I'm not sure I would. If this company weren't going private I'd be happy to be a buyer at this price today, especially with how their results have improved. The lesson I've taken away from this investment is that even when everything works out according to a plan it's still possible to experience an investment loss. The problem is as a minority shareholder I am tagging along on all of my investments. I can't control what a company's management does to outside shareholders. If management decides to take action which is detrimental to shareholders I can experience a loss even if my investment thesis is correct.
My experience with First Aviation has made me wary of the recent news out on Schuff Steel, a company I wrote about in 2012. The Schuff family sold their controlling stake to a private equity group. Schuff has the potential to play out in a manner that's similar to First Aviation. The company's results have been recovering dramatically but it's possible outside minority shareholders won't get to enjoy the reward associated with the results.
Disclosure: Long FAVS, SHFK
Scalable businesses and growth
Value investors have a reputation for not caring about growth. They want to buy a dollar for fifty cents regardless of any growth prospects. While value investors might not care about growth, businesses do. Businesses have an innate desire to grow, a longing to become larger and more prominent. I've spent a lot of time recently thinking about growth and scalable businesses, what follows are some of my thoughts on the subject by way of an analogy.
I want you to think of the market as a forest. A healthy forest is filled with a variety of trees and plants. There are tall trees, short trees, pine trees, oaks, maples, beeches, bushes, grasses, weeds, as well as numerous other plants. A forest doesn't grow all at once, it starts with a few grasses and slowly evolves into something mature. Markets are similar, they don't develop at once, they grow into maturity.
In a forest not all saplings grow into towering trees. Many saplings thrive for a while only to be deprived of enough sunlight or good soil before perishing. Sometimes a sapling falls victim to a grazing deer, or other destructive animal. Likewise there are more smaller companies in the market and not all of them will grow large. Some are small trees won't ever grow tall. Some fall victim to a predator, or are crowded out of the market place.
Given the right conditions, the right soil, and the right seeds a tree can grow large. A tree doesn't grow all at once, it takes decades. As a tree journeys from a sapling to a stalwart many things can happen destroying its progress. A tree might drop hundreds or thousands of seeds of which only a few become full fledged trees. Even less seeds become giant trees. A giant tree needs perfect conditions to crest above the other trees. Once it obtains a certain size it's own size becomes a strength. A larger tree can steal sunshine and nutrients from the rest of the forest. Size becomes a strength for a while.
Trees don't grow to the sky, eventually all trees, even the giant sequoias face an untimely end. Large trees are more susceptible to violent wind storms, they aren't as flexible as smaller trees. If the soil or environment changes large trees they have trouble recovering. Large trees are also targets for lumberjacks whose wood is more valuable.
The location in a forest helps determine the size of a tree. Have you ever noticed that the trees in a valley grow larger than the trees at the top of a hill? The trees at the top of a hill have less competition for light. The trees at the bottom of a valley need to grow above other trees in the valley plus the trees on the sides of the hill if they want light.
Companies trying to grow large face the same challenges as trees. For every large company there are hundreds of small companies attempting to grow quickly. Sometimes a small company successfully makes the journey from small to large, but often small companies remain small. People wonder why small companies stall out in their growth, why can't Second Cup become as large as Starbucks? What I find interesting is that we don't ask the same questions of the forest. Why don't we ask "why aren't all trees large?" There is a place for large and small trees in a forest, a forest with all large trees isn't healthy, there is no new growth. A healthy forest contains trees in all stages of growth. A healthy forest even contains weeds, which in the market might be promotional pink sheet companies with no hopes of profit.
There's an idea in the market that certain companies have moats, sustainable advantages that help them grow large. I believe the concept of a moat exists, but both small and large companies can have moats. Some large companies simply have size. They grew out of a set of circumstances that allowed them to capture marketshare faster than competitors. Once they achieved a certain size they were able to grow even faster due to their size. They are large, but they are also susceptible to storms or shifts in the market.
For a company to grow large it needs to exist in a perfect environment. It needs to have a product that serves a customer need, it needs a business model that's scalable, and it needs competitors who are slightly smaller and less equipped.
Most businesses are not scalable. Think about almost any local dining establishment. What makes it special is probably the cook and the ambiance. Those things can't be re-created, the cook can't be in two locations at the same time. A scalable business has a product that serve a need that can be created through a replicable process. There are many successful and profitable companies that are not scalable. I was thinking about the Jim Cramer franchise this afternoon. He's created a lot of wealth around his personality with books and TV shows. Yet when he decides to retire there will no one to take his place. There is not another Jim Cramer, his business will end. There are many companies like this where the personality of the founder is deeply ingrained in the business. Sometimes as investors this is hard to see. A founder retires and suddenly sales lag unexplainably. What we don't know is that the retired founder is the one who greased the wheels of the operation.
I would posit that almost all businesses are non-scalable. If one looks hard enough there is always a choke point or bottleneck that inhibits growth. Only a few companies are able to overcome this and grow into mega-cap companies. Look at Wal-Mart, or McDonalds. They have perfected the scalable business model. The problem is that as companies scale their complexity increases. Just like trees, as companies grow they become susceptible due to their size alone. If a storm comes and consumers decide they no longer want greasy hamburgers, fries and sugar laden soda McDonalds will have a hard time reacting quickly.
Large companies cannot grow infinitely, eventually their growth slows to the rate of GDP growth plus whatever financial engineering the CFO employs. As a company grows they need larger and large projects to move the needle. A small energy company might drill small wells that can provide a bonanza, yet a large company would ignore the same wells because it isn't worth their time. If a company is able to grow large enough their own size becomes an impediment. I remember reading an article a few years back about the chefs at McDonalds. They wanted to introduce a shrimp salad to their menu. They couldn't because the volume of shrimp they'd need to serve customers would quickly deplete the world's shrimp supply. As a result the company never introduced their shrimp salad (article). They are limited by their size.
There is a lot of money to be made by investors who can identify small saplings that will grow into towering oaks. If you find yourself owning a tree that's growing into a towering oak I'd recommend holding on tight and enjoying the ride. But keep in mind the ride could last decades or longer.
At the same time it's important to recognize that not all companies will grow large. Companies don't necessarily need to become towering trees to be successful. One of my favorite sights in the woods is a stand of young beech or aspen trees clumped together. What's vital though is to understand what you own. Do you own something that can scale into a tall tree, or merely a shrub. Some of the worst mistakes investors make are thinking shrubs or fast growing weeds will become sequoias.
When a tree finally dies it doesn't suddenly become useless. A fallen tree in a forest is a habitat for small woodland creatures. As a tree rots moss grows on it, insects inhabit it and it provides nourishment for the soil. Sometimes a dead tree becomes furniture, or boards for a home. Companies often face the same fate. It's unusual for a failed company to lock their doors and cease to exist. There are remnants of value, patents, intellectual property, and knowledge stored by former employees carried to their next ventures. In this way a dead company nourishes the forest long after it ceases to exist.
I want you to think of the market as a forest. A healthy forest is filled with a variety of trees and plants. There are tall trees, short trees, pine trees, oaks, maples, beeches, bushes, grasses, weeds, as well as numerous other plants. A forest doesn't grow all at once, it starts with a few grasses and slowly evolves into something mature. Markets are similar, they don't develop at once, they grow into maturity.
In a forest not all saplings grow into towering trees. Many saplings thrive for a while only to be deprived of enough sunlight or good soil before perishing. Sometimes a sapling falls victim to a grazing deer, or other destructive animal. Likewise there are more smaller companies in the market and not all of them will grow large. Some are small trees won't ever grow tall. Some fall victim to a predator, or are crowded out of the market place.
Given the right conditions, the right soil, and the right seeds a tree can grow large. A tree doesn't grow all at once, it takes decades. As a tree journeys from a sapling to a stalwart many things can happen destroying its progress. A tree might drop hundreds or thousands of seeds of which only a few become full fledged trees. Even less seeds become giant trees. A giant tree needs perfect conditions to crest above the other trees. Once it obtains a certain size it's own size becomes a strength. A larger tree can steal sunshine and nutrients from the rest of the forest. Size becomes a strength for a while.
Trees don't grow to the sky, eventually all trees, even the giant sequoias face an untimely end. Large trees are more susceptible to violent wind storms, they aren't as flexible as smaller trees. If the soil or environment changes large trees they have trouble recovering. Large trees are also targets for lumberjacks whose wood is more valuable.
The location in a forest helps determine the size of a tree. Have you ever noticed that the trees in a valley grow larger than the trees at the top of a hill? The trees at the top of a hill have less competition for light. The trees at the bottom of a valley need to grow above other trees in the valley plus the trees on the sides of the hill if they want light.
Companies trying to grow large face the same challenges as trees. For every large company there are hundreds of small companies attempting to grow quickly. Sometimes a small company successfully makes the journey from small to large, but often small companies remain small. People wonder why small companies stall out in their growth, why can't Second Cup become as large as Starbucks? What I find interesting is that we don't ask the same questions of the forest. Why don't we ask "why aren't all trees large?" There is a place for large and small trees in a forest, a forest with all large trees isn't healthy, there is no new growth. A healthy forest contains trees in all stages of growth. A healthy forest even contains weeds, which in the market might be promotional pink sheet companies with no hopes of profit.
There's an idea in the market that certain companies have moats, sustainable advantages that help them grow large. I believe the concept of a moat exists, but both small and large companies can have moats. Some large companies simply have size. They grew out of a set of circumstances that allowed them to capture marketshare faster than competitors. Once they achieved a certain size they were able to grow even faster due to their size. They are large, but they are also susceptible to storms or shifts in the market.
For a company to grow large it needs to exist in a perfect environment. It needs to have a product that serves a customer need, it needs a business model that's scalable, and it needs competitors who are slightly smaller and less equipped.
Most businesses are not scalable. Think about almost any local dining establishment. What makes it special is probably the cook and the ambiance. Those things can't be re-created, the cook can't be in two locations at the same time. A scalable business has a product that serve a need that can be created through a replicable process. There are many successful and profitable companies that are not scalable. I was thinking about the Jim Cramer franchise this afternoon. He's created a lot of wealth around his personality with books and TV shows. Yet when he decides to retire there will no one to take his place. There is not another Jim Cramer, his business will end. There are many companies like this where the personality of the founder is deeply ingrained in the business. Sometimes as investors this is hard to see. A founder retires and suddenly sales lag unexplainably. What we don't know is that the retired founder is the one who greased the wheels of the operation.
I would posit that almost all businesses are non-scalable. If one looks hard enough there is always a choke point or bottleneck that inhibits growth. Only a few companies are able to overcome this and grow into mega-cap companies. Look at Wal-Mart, or McDonalds. They have perfected the scalable business model. The problem is that as companies scale their complexity increases. Just like trees, as companies grow they become susceptible due to their size alone. If a storm comes and consumers decide they no longer want greasy hamburgers, fries and sugar laden soda McDonalds will have a hard time reacting quickly.
Large companies cannot grow infinitely, eventually their growth slows to the rate of GDP growth plus whatever financial engineering the CFO employs. As a company grows they need larger and large projects to move the needle. A small energy company might drill small wells that can provide a bonanza, yet a large company would ignore the same wells because it isn't worth their time. If a company is able to grow large enough their own size becomes an impediment. I remember reading an article a few years back about the chefs at McDonalds. They wanted to introduce a shrimp salad to their menu. They couldn't because the volume of shrimp they'd need to serve customers would quickly deplete the world's shrimp supply. As a result the company never introduced their shrimp salad (article). They are limited by their size.
There is a lot of money to be made by investors who can identify small saplings that will grow into towering oaks. If you find yourself owning a tree that's growing into a towering oak I'd recommend holding on tight and enjoying the ride. But keep in mind the ride could last decades or longer.
At the same time it's important to recognize that not all companies will grow large. Companies don't necessarily need to become towering trees to be successful. One of my favorite sights in the woods is a stand of young beech or aspen trees clumped together. What's vital though is to understand what you own. Do you own something that can scale into a tall tree, or merely a shrub. Some of the worst mistakes investors make are thinking shrubs or fast growing weeds will become sequoias.
When a tree finally dies it doesn't suddenly become useless. A fallen tree in a forest is a habitat for small woodland creatures. As a tree rots moss grows on it, insects inhabit it and it provides nourishment for the soil. Sometimes a dead tree becomes furniture, or boards for a home. Companies often face the same fate. It's unusual for a failed company to lock their doors and cease to exist. There are remnants of value, patents, intellectual property, and knowledge stored by former employees carried to their next ventures. In this way a dead company nourishes the forest long after it ceases to exist.
What's wrong in bank boardrooms?
This is annual report season for many companies, especially banks. Since I own 25+ banks in my portfolio I've been inundated with bank annual reports. I rarely read the entire report because in most cases I've already seen the bank's financials on CompleteBankData.com by the time I receive the report in the mail. Even though I've seen the financials I like to receive the reports for a few reasons. The first is I like to read the President's letter if there is one. Secondly I like to evaluate the quality of the report, by this I mean the material it was printed on. Some annual reports appear like they were Xeroxed off in the back room, stapled by the tellers and mailed third-class. Others are heavy card stock and fully of colorful glossy pictures and inspirational quotes. But what I really enjoy looking at are the profiles for the directors of the banks.
After thumbing through some of the proxies send with the reports this week I have to ask:
Who are the empty suits filling bank board rooms?
The board of directors at a company are supposed to represent shareholders' interest in the company. Shareholders elect them to hire and fire the management team and run the company for the benefit of the shareholders. That's the theory at least.
The reality is often very different. A bank's board of directors are usually friends and acquaintances of the CEO or Chairman. They are often somehow involved in the community which in the community banking world somehow qualifies them for directorship. A friend of mine jokes that being a funeral director is a qualification to being a community bank director.
If the board is tasked with managing the managers it would make sense for them to know about banking. Good managers should have an idea of what their subordinates are doing. Bad managers are clueless and often have their head in the sand. The problem is most bank directors have zero banking experience meaning they are ineffective at managing a bank's executives. At these banks the board is reduced to agreeing with management because they don't know better. If the CEO says the lending environment is difficult they agree nodding their heads in unison.
When I page through proxies for some of the banks I own I see directors that run HVAC companies, a golf course, an organic vegetable farm, a seafood company, and a lot of real estate and construction related businesses. In most cases the bank states that the individual's experience in running some small company in their community qualifies them because of their experience with the local market.
A former bank regulator told me a story about a bank he worked with in the 1990s. He said that as he was evaluating the board he discovered that all of the directors had ties to the local auto industry with most being car dealers. When the regulator began to examine the bank's loan book he found that most of the bank's loans were auto loans. Guess what dealerships were doing significant business with that bank? The regulators forced the bank to reduce their auto lending and change the composition of their board. Unfortunately management abuse isn't always that obvious.
I sometimes wish for radical and honest transparency. It would be refreshing to see the truth in a proxy. What if a director nominee's blurb stated something like this: "The CEO and the nominee's sons play on the same soccer team. The nominee and other directors have been in the same fantasy football league for 13 years." or "This nominee's business does significant business with the bank. The bank CEO informally agreed to put the nominee on the board in exchange for continued business."
Another axe I have to grind are with directors who make a career out of being directors. You know the type, their bio talks about a job they held in "business development" in the early 1980s. Since then their only experience seems to be serving on boards. Some directors serve on a number of different boards, enough that they can string together quite a salary.
There are always exceptions to the rule, but not many. One bank I own seems to have the type of board I'd like to see everywhere. FS Bancorp's board consists of individuals who have prior banking experience, or worked in finance and investing. Another exception is in the bio of one director at Sound Financial. This director works in the food industry but states that he has taken extensive training courses and seminars on banking during his term as a director. Even though his professional experience isn't in banking he's made a significant effort to learn the industry something that should be applauded.
There are two solutions to this problem, a regulatory solution and a market solution. The regulatory solution would be a set of rules that force director independence. These rules already exist and they don't seem to be working. The market solution is for investors in these sleepy and mismanaged institutions to fire the directors and to nominate new ones with satisfactory backgrounds. Some of this is accomplished through activist investors, but the majority of the work needs to come from non-activist bank shareholders. I vote against almost all director nominees at banks I own. If someone owns a Vitamin Shoppe that doesn't qualify them to be a director, I let the bank know that with a no vote.
Disclosure: Long Sound Financial, Long FS Bancorp
After thumbing through some of the proxies send with the reports this week I have to ask:
Who are the empty suits filling bank board rooms?
The board of directors at a company are supposed to represent shareholders' interest in the company. Shareholders elect them to hire and fire the management team and run the company for the benefit of the shareholders. That's the theory at least.
The reality is often very different. A bank's board of directors are usually friends and acquaintances of the CEO or Chairman. They are often somehow involved in the community which in the community banking world somehow qualifies them for directorship. A friend of mine jokes that being a funeral director is a qualification to being a community bank director.
If the board is tasked with managing the managers it would make sense for them to know about banking. Good managers should have an idea of what their subordinates are doing. Bad managers are clueless and often have their head in the sand. The problem is most bank directors have zero banking experience meaning they are ineffective at managing a bank's executives. At these banks the board is reduced to agreeing with management because they don't know better. If the CEO says the lending environment is difficult they agree nodding their heads in unison.
When I page through proxies for some of the banks I own I see directors that run HVAC companies, a golf course, an organic vegetable farm, a seafood company, and a lot of real estate and construction related businesses. In most cases the bank states that the individual's experience in running some small company in their community qualifies them because of their experience with the local market.
A former bank regulator told me a story about a bank he worked with in the 1990s. He said that as he was evaluating the board he discovered that all of the directors had ties to the local auto industry with most being car dealers. When the regulator began to examine the bank's loan book he found that most of the bank's loans were auto loans. Guess what dealerships were doing significant business with that bank? The regulators forced the bank to reduce their auto lending and change the composition of their board. Unfortunately management abuse isn't always that obvious.
I sometimes wish for radical and honest transparency. It would be refreshing to see the truth in a proxy. What if a director nominee's blurb stated something like this: "The CEO and the nominee's sons play on the same soccer team. The nominee and other directors have been in the same fantasy football league for 13 years." or "This nominee's business does significant business with the bank. The bank CEO informally agreed to put the nominee on the board in exchange for continued business."
Another axe I have to grind are with directors who make a career out of being directors. You know the type, their bio talks about a job they held in "business development" in the early 1980s. Since then their only experience seems to be serving on boards. Some directors serve on a number of different boards, enough that they can string together quite a salary.
There are always exceptions to the rule, but not many. One bank I own seems to have the type of board I'd like to see everywhere. FS Bancorp's board consists of individuals who have prior banking experience, or worked in finance and investing. Another exception is in the bio of one director at Sound Financial. This director works in the food industry but states that he has taken extensive training courses and seminars on banking during his term as a director. Even though his professional experience isn't in banking he's made a significant effort to learn the industry something that should be applauded.
There are two solutions to this problem, a regulatory solution and a market solution. The regulatory solution would be a set of rules that force director independence. These rules already exist and they don't seem to be working. The market solution is for investors in these sleepy and mismanaged institutions to fire the directors and to nominate new ones with satisfactory backgrounds. Some of this is accomplished through activist investors, but the majority of the work needs to come from non-activist bank shareholders. I vote against almost all director nominees at banks I own. If someone owns a Vitamin Shoppe that doesn't qualify them to be a director, I let the bank know that with a no vote.
Disclosure: Long Sound Financial, Long FS Bancorp
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