A few thoughts on ROIC

"the cash return on cash spent for capital." - Ken Hackel

It never fails, if I include my return on invested capital calculation in a post I will invariably get a few comments or emails questioning it or asking for clarification.  This last post was no exception.

The ROIC calculation I use is a bit unique, but I can't take credit for it.  I use a calculation that Ken Hackel presents in his book Security Valuation and Risk Analysis: Assessing Value in Investment Decision-Making.  The book focuses on evaluating companies on a cash flow basis.  This means looking at free cash flow, cash return on invested cash, and sources and uses of cash.

Cash and cash flow are the focus of the book because cash flow based numbers show a true flow of what's moving in and out of a business not an accounting version.  Often the accounting picture can be gamed by adjusting estimates.  Some accounting metrics are just outlandish, my favorite is Adjusted-EBITDA.  It seems every company now has an Adjusted-EBITDA number that only includes good things and excludes any potentially bad items.  I've also noticed that executive bonuses are usually based on these fiction numbers as well.  Quite a nice gig if you can get it!

Ken Hackel gives this reason to use a cash flow based ROIC formula verses a more standard EBITDA/EBIT version:

"In essence, entities having a low ROIC or dependent on large capital expenditures resulting in small amounts of distributable cash flows deserve low valuation metrics despite their higher rates of growth in GAAP-related yardsticks.  This is why many investors are fooled, having invested in low-P/E companies." (Hackel, p252)

Hackel mentions that he searched EDGAR to find the most common ROIC formula that companies use to measure themselves, this was the result:


EBITDA + interest income * (1-tax rate) + goodwill amortization
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
total assets - (current liabilities + short term debt + accumulated depreciation)



A more accurate cash based version presented in the book is as follows:

free cash flow - net interest income
------------------------------------------------------
invested capital(equity + total interest bearing debt + present value of leases - cash marketable securities)

Hackel provides some reasons why specific values are included in the calculation.  Instead of trying to summarize his points I'm just going to quote him, he says it much better than I would.

"
1. Intangible assets because those funds were used to aquire cash producing assets.
2. All interest-bearing debt because this too was sold to purchase productive assets.
3. Present value of operating leases because this represents contractual debt in exchange for required assets needed to produce revenue, hence cash flows.  To exclude operating leases would be to unfairly boost the ROIC and to distort the comparison between companies that buy assets or enter into capital leases and those which enter into operating leases.
4. Since free cash flow is uses, it includes the payment of cash taxes and the elimination of other accruals." (Hackel, p252)

Of course no formula is perfect and there are a few downsides to this formula.  Activities that go straight to the equity statement such as foreign currency translation adjustments, actuarial gains/losses, changes in fair value of available-for-sale assets/cash flow hedges, and revaluations of property, plant and equipment end up affecting the formula.  These changes would need to be backed out to get an accurate picture of the company's cash return on capital acquired for cash.

When I read this formula in the book it really resonated with me and I've been using it as I analyze companies.  Some investors might consider it a bit too stringent, but I don't mind that.  The formula has come in handy finding companies that end up directing most of their cash to working capital or capex.  I don't want to invest in companies that have great net income numbers but don't have the cash flow to back it up.

Disclosure:  If you purchase the book through Amazon I will receive a small commission.  There is no difference in book price entering Amazon through my link, or on your own.  I received this book as a gift from a family member, the author or publisher has never contacted me.

Branding this Canadian Leather Retailer as Cheap

Danier Leather (DL.Canada)

Price: C$10.70 (2/15/2012)

Recently a reader sent me an email asking for my opinion on a stock they were looking at.  The company is Danier Leather a Canadian retailer.  The company has retail locations located in malls and power centers which are large outdoor malls.  Danier is a vertically integrated leather company meaning they don't just sell leather apparel they also design and manufacture it.  They source their leather from China and then manufacture their designs domestically.

Before I dive into the weeds I want to make a small investment case for Danier Leather:
-Trading slightly above NCAV
-55% of market cap in cash
-EV/EBIT of 2.16
-EV/FCF of 11.02
-ROE of 12%

Asset value examined

I recently overhauled my net-net template to something that I think will be easier to read and contain more information.  Danier is a perfect company to trial the template on:



There are two columns, the first shows the balance sheet values for different assets.  The second column shows a discounted value of that asset.  Both columns have a per share breakdown as well.

So as you can see with Danier they have an NCAV of $9.06 a share, and a discounted NCAV of $6.08 per share.  Most of the company's assets are in cash and inventory which isn't surprising given they are a retailer.  It might seem strange that they don't have a large account receivable balance but this makes sense.  When a customer comes into a store they pay on the spot, the company shouldn't be waiting for a payment from customers at all.

The item that stuck out to me when reviewing the balance sheet was that there was a relatively small balance of fixed assets.  Knowing that most locations are in malls I figured Danier doesn't own any retails space.  So I searched the annual report for operating leases and voila an off balance sheet contingency.

Adding back the operating leases discounted to the present squarely knocks Danier out of the net-net category.  If they were to liquidate they could still contractually be on the hook for those leases, and the minimum lease amount is more than cash on hand eliminating that buffer.

Fortunately for the reader who asked about Danier all is not lost.  Even though Danier isn't a solid net-net it's not really a problem, the company has no plans to liquidate and in fact they have something most net-net's don't have, a decent business.

The operating business

The company has had a nice run of profitability outside of a small loss in 2009 which is a bit surprising because Canada only had a mild recession as a result of missing the housing bubble.  Some people argue that Canada is in a housing bubble now, but based on Danier's earnings it doesn't appear like too many people are borrowing on their homes to purchase leather goods.

The company has a nice summary in their annual report of the past few years results:


The key takeaway for me is that results aren't consistent but they've been profitable four out of the last five years.  The second key point is that shares outstanding has been declining at a pretty rapid pace, almost 30% fewer shares in 2011 than in 2007.

The next thing I did was to steal an idea from Richard Beddard at Interactive Investor Blog (a must read if you don't already).  He likes to show the growth in book value by breaking out tangible assets, intangible assets and cumulative dividends.  Danier doesn't pay a dividend so I decided to do two charts, one showing assets on a gross basis, and the second showing assets on a per share basis.  The second chart is what shareholders get as a result of buybacks, a steadily increasing book value per share.


Gross Assets
Assets per Share

The last thing I looked at was the return on invested capital.  I get questions about this all the time so I want to explain my calculation.  I take free cash flow divided by equity minus cash plus debt and operating leases.  So let me explain a bit, I use free cash flow because this is a realized return above what the company needs to operate.  This eliminates companies that eat up a dollar generating a dollar even if on a net income or EBIT basis returns look great there's nothing left over for shareholders.  Secondly I add in operating leases because this is an intangible asset the company needs for their business.  If Danier didn't have their leases they wouldn't have a place to sell their apparel.

In computing this for Danier I ended up with a 3.56% ROIC.  Here is the calculation:



Putting it all together

So what we have is a retailer that has a solid balance sheet operating leases not withstanding.  They have a stable sales history and a pretty good track record of profitability recently.  The company's free cash flow has fluctuated over the years with inventory build ups and draw downs.  When free cash is flush the company's used it to buy back shares which have increased the book value for shareholders.

I like to invest in businesses that have an absolute margin of safety which is something I'm not seeing with Danier.  The balance sheet at first appears to provide it but once all liabilities are considered the margin disappears.  The company is undeniably cheap trading below book, with a low P/E and EV/EBIT multiple.

Danier doesn't jump out to me as a fat pitch stock.  The stock is cheap, but there are a lot of cheap stocks out there.  The question to ask "Is Danier cheap due to it's business or something external?"  I don't know the answer.  I also recognized I'm biased because leather doesn't seem to be in style in the US, which means nothing for Canada and a Canadian retailer.  This is probably the type of stock for someone who likes to build a portfolio of low EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT or P/CF stocks would own and do well with.

Talk to Nate about Danier Leather

Disclosure: No position

One heck of a hidden asset

Central Natural Resources (CTNR.OTC)

Price: $27 (2/7/2012)

Market Cap: $13,000,000

Often I will read an investment thesis that hinges on some sort of hidden asset.  A hidden asset is something a company might own that is either under monetized or maybe held on the books at an exceptionally low cost.  In theory most investors somehow skip over these hidden assets when doing their research leaving them as a pot of gold for enterprising or inquiring investors.

I have my doubts about how many hidden assets are truly actually hidden and missed by investors.  I own one company that could possibly qualify, Bowl America.  They own 17 bowling alleys in the DC area and Florida, the real estate is held on the books at cost.  The key is these centers were purchased in the 1950s, so presumably DC real estate is worth much more now than in 1950.  Even though the real estate would qualify as a hidden asset I'm not sure how hidden it is.  Most of the investment writeups on Bowl America all discuss the hidden value of the real estate.  If all investors are looking at the mis-priced real estate it's not all that hidden.

One example of a asset being truly hidden is the case of EDCI.  EDCI was a company that entered liquidation a while back that I owned and followed.  At one point in their liquidation process they announced they sold some patents they regarded as worthless for a few million dollars.

Readers might have noticed that recently I'm highlighting a lot of un-followed and mostly unknown companies.  For some background I've been working my way through a book the Walkers Manual of Unlisted stocks.  I started with the A's and have been steadily moving towards Z.  Some of the companies have gone private, for others there is no information available at all.  Some like Central Natural Resources don't file with the SEC but do put their financials out on their website.  The exercise has been fun, most of these companies are simple to research and it's fun to hunt down hard to find information.

For a quick background Central Natural Resources is a resource company based out of Kansas City.  They own some coal properties along with some gas wells.  Most of their income comes from mineral leases on the land they own.  The company is pretty simple and straight forward, price of gas/coal * amount extracted minus extraction costs and salary equals profit for investors.  The company has been pretty good about paying out a good chunk of profits to investors as dividends.

The hidden asset at Central Natural Resources is a bit more hidden than usual, it only appears in the annual reports as a single sentence.


This is curious, the company has a large coal deposit which hasn't been mined yet being carried for $700,000.  When I read about this I wondered what 92m tons of coal would go for on the spot market.  Using a NYMEX quote of $57.87 per ton that coal has a gross value of $5 billion dollars!  Sure there are mining costs, and transport costs and all sorts of other things but remember that Central Natural Resources's market cap is $13,000,000, there is a lot of wiggle room there.  The value of the coal alone is 400x the trading price of this company.

The problem I have with hidden assets is that while they're supposedly unknown to investors they are well known to the people running the company.  And it's not a far stretch to say insiders probably know the true value of the asset.  Sometimes an insider will be buying back stock trying to capitalize on this discrepancy.  But mostly insiders don't seem to care much, and are content to let a supposedly valuable asset lie idle or dormant.

As I was thinking about Central Natural I kept thinking that management knew they had a $13 million dollar company with a $5 billion dollar asset, so why didn't they get moving on mining it?  I skimmed a few of their annual reports and found some vague references answering my question.  It seems those 92m tons of coal aren't exactly easy to extract, the company has looked into mining it but there have been no mine operators who are interested in digging it out.

Maybe after all the $700k carrying value is overstated?  If there's a pot of gold in the ground that's impossible to extract does it have a value?  Maybe this coal will be like the shale gas, in a few years someone will discover a way to extract hard to reach coal cheaply and Central Natural Resources will make a lot of investors rich.

My conclusion is that relying on a hidden asset to make an investment thesis seems fraught with problems, most where were highlighted above.  This doesn't mean an investor should ignore an asset like the 92m tons of coal, but rather they should view it as an option on their investment.  If something lucky happens and the coal is dug out everyone wins. On the other hand if the investment thesis is based on the value of the coal there's the potential and likely outcome of disappointment when the coal remains in the ground forever.

At this point I should mention that Central Natural Resources actually looks attractive on a stand alone basis, they're overcapitalized with $4.6m in cash and a small amount of debt.  They're trading at a EV/FCF multiple of 6x.  If natural gas prices or coal prices rise again they should do very well.

Talk to Nate about Central Natural Resources

Disclosure: No position

Rules for net-net investing

I often write about net-net's on this blog and from time to time I get questions asking for certain clarifications to my net-net investment process.  I don't have a written guide so I thought this would be a good place to put down some rules I try to follow.

I guess in a way this could be considered a checklist for investing in a net-net.  I prefer to think of these notes as my net-net guidelines.  Even though these rules are numbered there is no importance to the numbering.  The reason for this is that each investment is different, for some companies #6 might be the most important issue, whereas for others #2 might be more important.

1) All rules can be broken but only for a very good reason.  Good reasons must have a much higher burden of proof.

2) Always prefer cash to inventory and receivables unless:

  • Management is acquisitive, in general stay away.
  • There are restrictions on a dividend.
3) If there are securities on the balance sheet consider if they are encumbered by a relationship.  Are the securities a company in the supply chain, or a cross holding?

4) Prefer shrinking receivables and shrinking inventory accounts.

  • If inventory is shrinking too fast cash will need to be used to build it back up soon, beware.
5) Prefer cash flow and free cash flow over net income if a decision is forced.  Prefer both if possible.

  • Check the accruals ratio for both balance sheet and cash flow accruals.  High accruals are a concern.

6) Stay away from companies that continually change strategy and business line.

7) If operating results are poor is there a chance they will turn around?

8) Determine why the company is selling below NCAV.

  • Is it a good reason?
  • Is the general industry in decline?
  • How obvious is the reason?
  • What changed recently?

9) Would I loan this company my own money for a five year term?  How likely is it I would get it back?

10) Am I relying on non-liquid assets that need to be liquidated?  Is there a market for those assets?  How quickly do those assets sell?

11) If possible try to ascertain how long the company has been trading below NCAV.

12) Always check message boards and blogs if possible.  Current investors have much better insight into the ongoing operations and past struggles.

13) Are there a ton of value investors already invested in this stock?  If this is such a popular idea why is it still cheap?

14) Is there a catalyst on the horizon?  Have there been rumors of catalysts for years that have never materialized?

15) Do I need to rely on a catalyst to realize my investment?


If you have any more suggestions to add I'd love to hear them, leave them in the comments or feel free to send me an email.

Talk to Nate about net-net investing

3U Holdings a true Ben Graham net-net stock

3U Holdings AG (UUUX.Germany)

Price: €.72 (1/29/2012)

A reader left a comment under my post on the performance of international net-net stocks and mentioned 3U Holdings AG.  It's possible most readers missed the comment since it was in French but thanks to my French/English dictionary from high school and Google Translate I was able to muddle through.  I'm glad I did because 3U Holdings is a really interesting company.  So to the commenter:

Merci de mentionner 3U Holdings, la société est intéressante et bonne valeur mais ne pas parfait.

Background

3U Holdings started off in 1997 as a German long distance carrier.  Through the years the company acquired other telecom companies and grew to service other countries in Europe.  It seems the company stayed in the wireline business with a few brief jaunts into presentation lines and SMS technology.  In 2007 the company decided they didn't want to be in the wireline operations business anymore so they outsourced operations and became an investment holding company.

Then in 2009 the company decided to change strategies again, they felt that renewable energy would be the future so they entered the solar production market.  They have a subsidiary which produces solar vacuum systems and another subsidiary that manufactures solar components.

In summary the company owns a handful of network operator codes in Germany, some SMS companies, a management consulting arm, and finally the solar components pieces.

Investment Thesis

The reason I was interested in 3U Holdings is because the stock is trading below NCAV, it's actually trading below net cash value.

Here is my net-net worksheet for the company:



The first thing that stands out is that this company is trading below net cash value, not by a lot but by a few eurocents.  The next thing I noticed is that 3U Holdings is trading below 66% of NCAV, they're trading at 63.7% of NCAV.  Ben Graham mentioned that buying a handful of securities for 2/3 or less of NCAV and selling when NAV is reached is a very profitable strategy.  The idea is to avoid concentration in just a few of these companies but instead purchase a basket of similar companies all selling below 2/3 of NCAV, 3U Holdings surely qualifies.

The company seems to be prudently selling off old wireline assets and growing their cash hoard.  As with most legacy telecom businesses revenue has been declining from the wireline segment but the renewable energy segment's growth was enough to offset the decline for now.  The company is expecting a boom in 2012 due to Germany lowering renewable rates 15%.  I believe this means that consumers will pay 15% less for energy from a renewable source which should spur growth in the renewable energy market.

What's the risk?

3U Holdings reminds me of another company I looked at recently LICT.  The issue with both of these companies is that their main business is capital intensive and sales are declining.  The good news for 3U Holdings is that they don't have any debt.  The bad news is that the wireline business is sucking up a lot of cash.

In the trailing nine months operations sopped up €11m in cash.  The company received €27m from a sale of discontinued operations but due to working capital changes and capex costs the cash balance only increased by €5m during the year.

As readers of the blog know I'm married to the concept of a margin of safety.  3U Holdings has a very strong asset margin of safety, but I'm concerned about the margin one level deeper at the operating company.  I want to see the company's operations turn cash flow positive or at least as close as possible.  If the company continues to lose money there's the potential that the cash balance could be wiped out and the asset margin disappear.

To me the biggest risk and the reason this stock is selling so low is that there isn't clarity as to whether the cash balance will remain untouched or if operations will burn through it over the course of the next few years.

So what happens next?

I have referenced in previous posts that with a net-net stock the logical thing to do would be to either liquidate or reshuffle operations so the market recognizes the value of the organization.  The reason for this is that if management continues to operate the company in a way that got them to trade below NCAV shareholders would be better off if the company just liquidated than continue down the same path as before.

The good news for 3U Holdings shareholders is that management recognizes there is a problem with the valuation and they are attempting to do something about it.  The company authorized and plans to commence a buyback of 10% of the shares outstanding.  In addition managers have purchased more shares adding to the 28% they already own.

The company also pays out a dividend and the shares currently yield 2.78%.

Summary

3U Holdings is a tough stock for me, the discount to tangible assets and cash is enticing.  I'm practicing restraint for now because the company is eating through cash.  I've been easily lured into asset discount situations in the past and then was surprised when a mildly struggling operation turned into a dire situation and ate through my margin of safety.

I think I'm going to sit on the sidelines with 3U Holdings and wait a quarter or two and watch their cash flow statements.  If the cash starts to stabilize I will probably buy a small stake.

Talk to Nate about 3U Holdings

Disclosure: No position

CIBL: spinoff, yes; catalyst, yes; possible five bagger, yes

CIBL (CIBY.OTC)
Company website: http://www.ciblinc.com/index.htm

Price: $625

I want to thank Adam Sues from Value Uncovered for mentioning this stock to me.  If you don't know Adam he's an avid deep value investor who has an interest in the same types of stocks I like.  I reached out to him a while back and mentioned a few obscure names and when he commented he'd already seen the companies and researched them I knew I found a kindred spirit.  Adam doesn't post as often now that he's pursuing his MBA but I would highly recommend adding his site to RSS.  Also I know he's looking for internships, so if you work at a value fund and have a position consider reaching out to him.

Edit: I made a slight change to this post after first posting due to a comment.  I added in net income multiples to the TV Station spreadsheet.  I also changed the final share total.

Background

CIBL is a small holding company that was spun out of LICT (posted about here) a bit over three years ago.  LICT is a wireline company and when spinning out CIBL saddled it with a lot of seemingly random assets.  CIBL has ownership interests in the following, two Iowa TV stations a wireless partnership interests in New Mexico, a loan to a LICT subsidiary and 10,000 shares of a privately held company Solix Inc.

The company has a familiar face on the board, Mario Gabelli of Gamco investors.  Gabelli is a Graham and Dodd value investor, so there is some comfort there that value should be maximized for shareholders.

Structure

To understand CIBL you have to understand their holdings, and the structure of the holdings.  CIBL doesn't own the TV stations or wireless partnerships completely, they own interests in these entities. CIBL owns 20% of WHBF and 50% of WOI-TV ABC.

The wireless partnerships are a bit more complicated, CIBL owns 51% of Wescel Wireless which in turn owns a 33% interest in New Mexico RSA #5 and a 25% interest in New Mexico RSA #3.  CIBL also owns a portion of Wescel II which owns 8.33% in New Mexico RSA #3.  The RSA's have a wireless service area of 160,000 people.  The general partner on the wireless interests is Verizon Wireless and the wireless service is sold as Verizon. 

Why is it cheap?

I have what I think are the reasons that CIBL is selling at such a low valuation.

  • Small illiquid stock - Perfectly valid reason, $15m market cap with shares that trade rarely.
  • Limited float - Most of the float is owned by Gamco partners, this ties into the first reason.
  • No SEC filings - A lot of investors pass companies that don't file, CIBL is unlisted but publishes audited financials on their website.
  • Complex structure - CIBL doesn't own any of their assets outright, they own interests in assets, this could complicate a valuation.
All of the reasons for cheapness can be summed up in the statement that CIBL is a very small unknown, under researched company that is hard to buy shares in.  Not many people want to deal with something in the $15m range especially if the company doesn't file with the SEC.  The good news is this leaves a lot of room for enterprising investors.

Catalyst

Usually I will present a company and a valuation before I talk about a potential catalyst.  I'm switching things around for CIBL because the valuation depends on the catalyst. 

In the latest annual report and then in subsequent quarterly reports there is a very interesting quote

"The Company has received, and is reviewing an expression of interest in certain of its remaining telecommunications properties at values in excess of the current trading price for CIBL stock. There can be no assurance that this expression of interest will result in a transaction of any sort, and the Company cannot predict the outcome, timing or any other element of this matter. However, it is possible that the result could be financially significant for the Company."

Let me summarize, someone wants to buy the wireless assets and the price for the wireless alone is greater than the current market cap which includes the TV assets among other things.  Not only is the price greater than the current value of the company it's significantly greater.


Valuation

In light of the catalyst I want to break down CIBL's valuation into two parts the TV stations and the wireless assets.  The way I want to look at both assets is on a buyout basis since management has stated that they intend to wind down the company if possible.

TV Stations

I did some searching and was able to find that in general TV stations usually sell for 6-10x broadcast cash flow.  Broadcast cash flow is considered cash flow before depreciation, time brokerage fees, and corporate and general expenses.  In addition to valuing the cash flow the value of the real estate is also considered.  So a complete TV station transaction would be 6-10x BCF plus the value of the real estate.  Notice that only the real estate is included not all the TV equipment, this is included in the BCF calculation, all that equipment is required to generate the cash flow.

The annual report and quarterly reports have a small footnote showing a summary balance sheet and three line income statement for both TV stations.  Unfortunately the only values we have to work with are revenue, gross profit and net income.  I put together a spreadsheet to estimate a potential range of TV station values based on what CIBL provides.  I estimated depreciation at 8% and the real estate portion at 10% of PP&E.  Both of these are estimates, 8% is what I've seen for capital intensive businesses, and 10% is based on the fact that TV stations need to buy a lot of expensive equipment to broadcast, it seems that 10% is probably a reasonable estimate for what the real estate is worth.

I put together a spreadsheet based on the 2010 annual report numbers.  Trailing twelve month numbers are in the Q3 report, but I don't know enough about TV to extrapolate what a fourth quarter might look like.  The Q3 numbers appear to be trending a bit better than last year at this time so if anything I'm a bit on the conservative side if the fourth quarter is similar to last year.



As you can see the range I came up with was $5.4m to $13.8m for the interest CIBL owns in the two TV stations.  I find it interesting that the high end estimate is basically the market cap of CIBL.

If you're uncomfortable with my estimated BCF I have multiples of net income in the spreadsheet as well.

Wireless

As expressed in the company's MD&A there has been interest in buying out a part or all of the wireless assets for more than the current share price.  So when thinking about a valuation it's safe to put a downside on the wireless assets at the current market price of $15m.

I did a lot of Googling and found some references stating that rural wireless companies have sold in the 9x EBITDA range over the past few years.  Like the TV interests breakout we don't have much for the wireless outside of revenue, gross profit, net income either.

I put together a spreadsheet like I did for the broadcast assets and I valued the wireless on two different metrics.  The first was I created an estimated EBITDA, I used 15% of revenue for depreciation, and figured the long term liabilities were debt at 5%.  The second metric was I just did a straight valuation based on net income.  This is a much more conservative approach, but even the lowest net income multiple valuation is higher than the market cap alone.

Here is the spreadsheet:


Other assets

When looking at a valuation there are a few other assets that CIBL owns that need to be valued as well, these include a note to a LICT subsidiary and 10,000 shares of Solix Inc a private company.  For the purposes of a breakup valuation we can probably take the note at face value which is $961,000 as of Sept 30th.  The note has a 5% interest rate and LICT's subsidiary has been paying it down over the past few quarters.

The value of the Solix stock is really tough, the company seems to be decent sized with over 400 employees and 65,000 sq ft of office space in NJ.  I couldn't find much beyond the typical webpage marketing fluff.  Solix could have 25,000 shares outstanding and this is an extremely valuable position or they could have 2b shares and the 10k that CIBL owns is a teeny tiny footnote.  Due to the uncertainty I'm going to just assign a value of zero to this position.

Putting things together

When looking at the pieces of CIBL the absurd valuation is clear, for CIBL to be fairly valued at current prices the TV stations need to be worthless, and the wireless partnerships are valued at 3x net income.

Here is the sum of the parts for CIBL:



An argument could be made that the total company won't be liquidated so an investor won't actually see this sort of return.  I would agree, but CIBL seems intent on paying out extra cash as dividends so in the worst case the return from the subsidiaries is paid out to shareholders while they wait for a liquidation.  I would also say that as CIBL has sold off assets in the past they've returned the entire proceeds to investors as a special dividend, so I'm not sure why a wireless asset sale would be any different.

Other resources

Another way to approach a valuation of CIBL would be to look at the cash distributions from the subsidiaries and value the company on a multiple of cash distributions.  If the company wasn't considering divesting a portion of itself I think this would be the best way to value CIBL.  For anyone interested I put together the cash flows for the last few years into a spreadsheet and have a picture of it below.


Summary

CIBL is fascinating in that the obscure structure masks the true valuation.  Management seems to know what the company is really worth and is attempting to sell off pieces, the problem for investors is that shares are hard to obtain.

I recognize that with this valuation I used a lot more assumptions than I normally would, but even in a worst case scenario where the wireless sells for 3x net income I still have a very large margin of safety.  The point of a margin of safety is to protect an investor against errors in assumptions.  If CIBL sells their broadcast for 2x BCF and wireless for 2x net income I would still make a profit at the current price.

Talk to Nate about CIBL

Disclosure: Long CIBL, attempting to accumulate more shares if possible.

International net-net's one year later (performance update)

About a year ago I created a list on Screener.co of all the stocks in ten different countries trading below NCAV that were debt free.  Over the past year I've profiled some of the companies and looked at numerous others.  I felt it would be fitting to go back and look at how all of the stocks that came up on my screener have performed over the past year.

Methodology

My testing was pretty simple, I put all of the quotes and data into a giant spreadsheet and I typed in each ticker one by one into FT.com.  I used the FT.com 1yr return as my return statistic, I have no idea how accurate this is, but in looking at the data I have a feeling it's generally more right than wrong.

For stocks that I could no longer get a quote I left them blank, and left them out of the average calculations.  I recognize that this could skew the results some. Some of these companies have been acquired, but the potential also exists that others have gone out of business.  I did some googling on a few of them and the ones I looked up fell roughly into the two buckets (bought out, failed) equally.  I didn't want to spend more time on this but if anyone is interested in backfilling this data I'd be interested in the refined set.

I am not an Excel guru so I've uploaded my spreadsheet to Google Docs and attached a link at the bottom of this post.  If anyone is so inclined I would love to know any fun facts from readers slicing and dicing the data.  Also if anyone has the returns for the missing companies I'd love to see that as well.

Results



Observations

As I was entering the numbers I had a feeling that the net-net strategy had failed over the past year, as most of the returns I entered were negative.  Consider out of the 214 that started 2011 only 30 had a positive return.  Overall an equal weighted portfolio would have just about broken even although poor it trounced a global ex-US benchmark.  The problem is that since so much outperformance came from such a small set of stocks it's likely an investor would have emotionally sold out after Comwest a $55,000 market cap company quadrupled, although at that point it still almost doubled again.

Here are a few general observations:

  • Canada has the best returns due to a few tiny speculative companies.  Building a position would have required purchasing most of the shares outstanding meaning these returns are mostly unachievable.
  • Germany had a 11% gain which seemed attainable by an average investor.
  • Only 21 companies had a return greater than 10%.
  • Buying only FCF positive or dividend paying firms resulting in a loss but still beat the benchmark.
  • Firms with a greater than 1m (in own currency) market cap returned -13.44%.
  • Firms with a smaller than 1m (in own currency) market cap returned 58%.
  • All of these returns assume a hedged portfolio.
  • Forty companies lost 50% or greater with a number of total losses.
  • The UK had the most "missing" companies.  I hope this is because the UK is more shareholder friendly and management worked to merge or take companies private.


Conclusion

Often I'll come across a blog post, or an article on the internet where the author posits that buying any company below NCAV is a good investment decision.  The data supports that conclusion if the investor buys ALL stocks selling below NCAV since the outperformance came from a very small set.  If someone were to just buy a random set of stocks below NCAV it's likely they would have performed close to the benchmark at best.

Looking through the list and then looking at my own portfolio led me to the conclusion that NCAV is a great starting point but further work needs to be done.  I say this because my own net-net portfolio performed quite well this past year, out of the 13 net-net's I own/owned only one is negative (Titon Holdings) all the rest are positive.  The reason for my good fortune isn't that I happened to buy a lucky handful of net-net's but rather that I looked through a lot and discarded them rather then buying anything, I ensured I had a valid margin of safety and that the business wasn't impaired.

This was a fun exercise, I still plan on hunting through net-net land, but as I mention above it's only a starting point.

Talk to Nate about net-net performance

Link to the spreadsheet (click File->Download Original)

Disclosure: Long 7466, 9814, 9932, ARGO, HYI, TON, VIN