Cork company comparison

I hope not to bore readers with another post on Corticeira Amorim but I wanted to do a side by side comparison with a competitor, French company Oeneo.  Just as a side note I'm expecting to have a much longer post ready later this week for readers who are looking for a deeper company analysis.

As I posted here and here Corticeira Amorim produces cork products including wine cork stoppers, cork flooring, insulation, and other cork products.  While Corticeira is a hidden champion this doesn't mean that they have a monopoly on the cork market, one company they share the wine stopper market with is Oeneo.

A bit of background, Oeneo considers itself a wine products company with a division in the corking business, different than Corticeira who considers themselves a cork company.  Either way I think the comparison is fair.


I like doing comparisons like this and probably don't do them often enough but they highlight important differences.  The biggest item that stands out to me is that Oeneo has a 7.21% profit margin vs the 4.5% margin of Corticeira.  On the other hand Corticeira appears more undervalued with a lower P/E and lower P/B.

The question an investor needs to ask themselves before investing in corks or wine making is would they rather pay more for a company with higher margins or a less profitably company that is selling at a cheaper price?  Or to flip it around, does a 7.2% profit margin vs a 4.5% profit margin justify an almost double P/E?

Disclosure: Long Corticeira Amorim


Argo Group, UK net-net

Argo Group Ltd (ARGO.UK)

Price 13.75 pence £10.2m market cap (7/18/2011)

I'm on a small vacation in sunny south Florida and reading the book Free Capital: How 12 private investors made millions in the stock market which is mainly about 12 British investors who have made millions in UK small caps.  The book is good, it's a nice light read which is perfect for the pool and beach.  I've been squeezing in a chapter here and there between playing in the waves with my son.  In the spirit of the book I decided to do a post on a UK small cap.

Argo Group is an investment management company that runs five emerging market funds.  The company is headquarters in Isle of Man but claims its main place of business is Cyprus.  The funds the company runs are headquartered in a variety of countries ranging from Cyprus, Romania, and Singapore to the UK.  The company is listed in the AIM yet uses the US Dollar as its functional currency even though it has no operations or tie to the US.  The company has been managing funds since the year 2000 and has 26 employees.

The funds Argo manages:
Argo Fund - A fixed income fund that invests in corporate and sovereign debt in addition to currencies. This fund is quoted on the Irish exchange and was founded in Oct 2000.
Global Special Situations Fund - Deals in distressed credits and special situations across all levels of the capital structure.
Capital Partners Fund - A closed-end fund founded in 2006 which aims to invest with a two to three year time horizon.  The fund invests in stocks, bonds, PIK loans, warrants, convertibles and shareholder loans.
Real Estate Opportunities Fund - A fund quoted on the AIM (AREOF) committed to property investments in Romania, Moldova and Ukraine.
Distressed Credit Fund - A bottom up distressed credit fund founded in 2008.

The company is a spinoff from Absolute Capital Management (ACMH) and was party to a lawsuit from before the spinoff.  It seems that the legal dispute was a very big weight on the shares, the case was dismissed a few months back.

Napkin sized investment thesis
-Fundholder lawsuit was dismissed in June ending the legal liability overhang as well as ongoing litigation costs ($614k in 2010 and $866k in 2009).
-Trading at a 40% discount to discounted NCAV
-Trading at a 38% discount to net cash
-Turned an operating profit of $1.2, net income of $1.7m in 2010
-$932k in CFO and $924k in FCF
-The company pays a 1.2p dividend yielding 8.8%
-Management is buying back $2m worth of shares
-Insider ownership is around 35%

This is a pretty clear net-net investment, the company is trading at a discount to it's net cash position and in addition is showing a small profit and free cash flow.  Here is my net-net worksheet, note the USD/Pound conversion.




The company seems to be doing a lot of things right in the absence of dynamic growth, they are returning cash to shareholders by paying out a generous dividend in addition to buying back shares.

While profitability and revenue have been declining for the past few years the company still sports impressive margins.
-Operating margin: 11%
-Net margin: 16%
-FCF margin: 8.4%

Why is it cheap?
I think there are a few things working against Argo that are causing the shares to trade below NCAV.
-The company is small, £10m market cap
-The company is closely held with a public float of £6.5m outstanding
-Argo was a spinoff which usually face indiscriminate selling and a short operating history.
-There was a lawsuit which was proving to be a slow cash drain, and had the possibility to threaten the business.
-The company is generally misunderstood, it's traded in the UK yet is based in Cyprus and uses the USD as its functional and presentation currency.  A cursory look via FT.com will give incorrect values.

I don't own any shares of Argo yet, but I'm strongly considering adding them to my net-net portfolio.  Just a small warning, the company is small with an average trading volume of £8k and appears to be pretty volatile in trading.

Talk to Nate about Argo

Disclosure: No position in Argo, I am doing further research and might initiate one at any time.

Daxor a gamble on management

Daxor (DXR.AMEX)

Price: $10.17 (7/11/2011)

Daxor is a company trading below net current assets or a net-net stock, it's a curious stock, all of the current assets are liquid and the company pays about a 5.8% dividend.  What's not to like?  Daxor is a classic case of buying one thing and getting another.

Daxor claims to be a medical innovation company, their main product is a blood volume analyzer product.  The blood volume analyzer takes a patients blood and is able to measure it very quickly.  The product seems simple enough and in a growing heath care market the sky is the limit.

The company also has $.88 in earnings per share and a solid slug of marketable securities.  Here is the net-net worksheet.


The net-net worksheet looks great, a nice amount of receivables and $53m in marketable securities, 123% of the market cap.

So what's the problem?  The problem is when digging into the income and cash flow statements we realized the medical devices are a red herring for the real business.  Let's take a look at the latest period income statement.

The company lost $2.17m in continuing operations yet had $.88 a share in EPS, the difference?  All made up in the following two line items: "Dividend income-investment portfolio" and "Realized gain on of securities, net".  Daxor is really an investment company in disguise.  While the medical device division lost $2.17m investments contributed $4.3m in gains.  The effects are more pronounced when taking a look at the full year results broken down by division.


The operating business lost $5.7m while investment income kicked in $10m in income, enough to offset the medical losses and post a positive gain.

When examining this stock rationally an investor might consider why management hasn't shut down its device division and liquidated the portfolio locking in a gain for investors.  I think the reason for this is if the medical division is abandoned Daxor would be considered an investment company and would be subject to SEC regulation.

Investment Portfolio

The 10-k has a section describing the investment guidelines for the company which are:
-Preferred and utility stocks
-Maintain 80% of the portfolio in utility stocks
-Maximum of 15% in speculative issues including short sales
-Use of options to increase income.

The risk for an investor is they are effectively trusting Daxor to manage their investments.  While the past results are satisfactory I'm not sure I want the possible turn around of a net-net hinging on a options trading setup.

It would be much easier to setup their own utility investment portfolio and sell covered calls themselves.  

Summary

I wanted to show in this post that even a net-net has manager risk to a varying degree.  I think there exists a faulty assumption that when investing in a net-net the investor can ignore the quality of management, that's not the case at all.  A net-net investor is relying on management to not make a stupid decision impairing the margin of safety.  


Disclosure: No position in Daxor

Hidden Champion Corticeira Amorim part 2

This is the part two post about Corticeira Amorim (COR.Portugal), you can view part one here.

In the first post I discussed the business units and some of the strengths Corticeira Amorim embodies as a hidden champion.  In this post I want to focus on the financial aspects that support the thesis first presented in part one.

I am going to take a look at the following items, return on invested capital, dividend history, a duPont analysis, free cash flow yield and the degree of operating leverage.  I will show the numbers for each figure, and then have a small amount of analysis around it.  My goal is taking this post with the first post will present a full figured analysis of Corticeira Amorim.  Each specific item is titled so it should be easy to skip to a certain piece of information.

Return on Invested Capital

I calculated ROIC for the past five years:


The good news is ROIC has been increasing and rapidly the last two years.  In 2009 the increase in FCF was due to working down receivables and inventory, whereas I believe 2010 is a more accurate picture of what an investor can expect in the future.

The second item that stands out is that ROIC has increased due to the repayment of debt over the past two years.  

Dividend History

The company has acted somewhat prudently with regards to dividends.  From 2005-2007 they had a conservative payout ratio which spiked during the recession.  In 2008 they paid out 140% of earnings, and halted the dividend in 2009 while they paid down debt and strengthened their balance sheet.

I actually appreciate the decisions management made with regards to a dividend, and the quickness in which it was restored as well.  The dividend was steadily climbing in the earlier part of this decade and if results continue to grow I would expect the dividend to continue to increase.


DuPont Analysis and ROE

A DuPont analysis breaks down the return on equity to a more granular level.  A ROE is composed of return on sales * asset turnover * leverage.  Examining the breakdown in each can show how the company is generating it's ROE and if the company is working with an efficient capital structure.

Here is the DuPont breakdown for Amorim:


The return on sales and asset turnover are about average for a business such as Amorim, and ROE gets a bit of juice from the leverage.  I appreciate that the company is paying down debt, and I like firms with little to no debt, but I think a bit of debt for Amorim is appropriate in the capital structure.

FCF Yield

There are a few ways to look at FCF Yield, FCF/MCap, FCF/EV, FCF/Equity.  I just went ahead and calculated all three values.  In addition there is the tangible yield which is what the company is paying out to shareholders as dividends mentioned above.


I'm not going to lie, these are great numbers, numbers I would expect for a hidden champion.

Degree of Operating Leverage

I was fascinated by how much earnings swung up from 2009 to 2010 on a small increase in sales, so I went ahead and put together a historical view of the operating leverage for Amorim.  Operating leverage is a way to look at how the company is able to scale on a fixed capital base.  Put another way a company that's a service company has to add more people, or have the people work longer hours to increase revenue and profits which are usually at a sort of fixed ratio.  A company with operating leverage is able to increase output on the same machines (fixed capital base) and increase profit without as big of a marginal capital commitment.

Operating leverage cuts both ways, on the way up it's magnificent because each dollar of revenue is a multiple of profit.  On the way down it hurts because the fixed capital requirement is constant, so in a downturn the company could start to turn a loss just trying to maintain the facilities.


In Amorim's case the operating leverage tells the story.  Sales increased 10% but EBIT increased 152%.  Higher incremental ticks in revenue are more valuable to the bottom line.

Valuation Scenarios


Corticeira Amorim has a lot of things going for it, a great free cash flow yield, a good dividend, great operating leverage.  The company is also trading on a cheap basis, with a EV/EBIT of 5.5 and P/E of 5.5.  Given all of this I wanted to plug the numbers into a few simple valuations based on multiples.

I was originally going to do a dividend discount model but I struggled with the discount rate.  The problem is the risk free rate isn't exactly risk free in Portugal, and with most sales international Amorim isn't really constrained to one market where a national bond could be used.  I gave up and decided a multiple analysis, and a comparison to Oeneo would be sufficient.


Oeneo (SBT:FR) is in the same line of business, they trade with a P/E of 11.28 and a EV/EBIT of 9.9.  The multiples on Oeneo are reasonable and considering they are in the same line of business, in the same market it's reasonable to conclude that Corticeira Amorim should trade at similar multiples.

Resources (in English)
2010 Annual Report
2009 Annual Report
2008 Annual Report
2007 Annual Report
Company Website

Talk to Nate about Corticeira Amorim

Disclosure: Long Corticeira Amorim

Looking at Hidden Champion Corticeira Amorim Part 1

Corticeira Amorim (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/quote?ticker=COR:PL)

Price €.99 (7/5/2011)

I have been reading the book Hidden Champions of the Twenty-First Century: The Success Strategies of Unknown World Market Leaders and one of the companies mentioned in the book is Corticeira Amorim a cork company based on Portugal.  I had looked at this company back in February but took a pass because the 2010 financials hadn't been released yet.  When I saw the company mentioned in the book I decided to take a look again and I really like what I found.

I wanted to break this post into two, the first portion I'm going to describe the business and what makes it a hidden champion in addition to some highlights.  In the second post out later this week I will dig into the financials that support this post.

I wanted to start with something I had read recently which is the thought that an investment thesis is too complex if it can't be written on the back of a napkin.  I liked this because it really makes an investor focus on what's important to a thesis.  When looking at a potential investment there is a lot of information to be sifted through, and the napkin approach distills the information to a nice tight thesis.  Without further ado:

Corticeria Amorim is a compelling investment based on the following factors:
-Ability to deliver in all kinds of markets since 1870
-Global market leader in the cork niche
-Insiders purchasing shares above current prices
-Company buying back shares
-Company trading at a reasonable value EV/EBIT of 5.5
-ROIC of 11%
-Latest dividend of €.10 for a 10.99% yield
-Company is associated with Portugal giving the cheap price while over 80% of business is from outside Portugal, export oriented.
-Has paid down 50% of debt in the past two years.

The idea behind the hidden champions is companies that are global market leaders that most people outside of the niche market have never heard of.  The companies focus on one product or idea, heavily invest in research, are conservatively run and financed, have decentralized business units, export oriented and growing.

Business Overview

Amorim operates in four business segments, Cork Stoppers, Cork Insulation, Floor and Wall Coverings, and Composite Cork.  Amorim embodies one aspect of hidden champions in how they view their business units.  Each business unit is run independently and operates almost as a separate company.  This gives the management in control flexibility and reduces layers of beurocracy.

Cork Stoppers - This is the business unit most people think of when they think of cork, wine bottle corks.  The Cork Stoppers unit supplies the big wine markets, France, Italy and Spain among others.  In the major wine markets wine consumption has increased 1.3% in 2010.  The stopper group increased volume 13.3% in 2010.  Gross margin for the division increased 18% over 2009 and EBIT increased 23% due to operating leverage.

Cork Insulation - The insulation business unit deals with cork sheets used as building insulation.  The sheets of cork are very dense, stable at high temperatures and provide excellent acoustic and thermal insulation.  I attempted to find an R-value for cork insulation but in doing so realized the R-value is a American industry created metric that favors fiber insulation.  Sales for this unit increased 5% in 2010 mainly in Europe and the Middle East.  The gross margin increased 7% over 2009 and EBIT increased 13%.

Floor and Wall Coverings - This business unit was founded in 1978 and located in Portugal, the unit designs and builds flooring composed of cork.  The products are environmentally friends, cost effective, retain heat well and don't retain dirt.  The products are sold to wholesalers who sell to the DIY market and professional installers.  Sales in this unit grew 7.6% in 2010 and the company achieved some cost reductions with regards to compensation.

Composite Cork - The composite cork unit focuses on integrating cork into non-standard applications, such as automotive gaskets, thermal protection shields, footwear and electronics.  This unit really took off in 2010 with sales increasing 23% and EBIT increasing 200%.  The large increase in EBIT was due to operating leverage and increases in production efficiency.

In the 2010 annual report Amorim has a picture showing sales by business unit:

I want to make a note, the Raw Materials unit is mostly internal sales as seen by the small amount of sales, they mostly supply the material for the other business units.  The picture is great in showing that Amorim is nicely diversified across business units, while the stopper unit is the biggest at 58% composite cork and the floor and wall covering units have sizable pieces as well.

Export Oriented

A large feature of hidden champions is that while they might be located in a home market most of their business comes from outside of the home market.  Amorim is no exception to this rule, while they are located in Portugal over 95% of their sales come from outside of their home market.  The following picture from the annual report shows this well:
The company also has sales offices in over 100 countries and major operations in Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, the United States, Brazil, Argentina, China, Tunisia and Australia.

The advantage for a company that's export oriented is that they have the ability to weather local market recessions better than home market companies.  As proof to this Amorim didn't experience any losses in 2008 and 2009, some of their business units in emerging markets actually posted record growth proving diversification works.

Going into 2011 the company devotes a section of their report to the economic conditions of Portugal in which they state they expect Portugal to head into another recession in addition to the sovereign debt crisis.  While this is not good for the country the company believes they won't be affected largely due to the strength of their worldwide operations and export nature.

Niche Leader

One common theme through all hidden champions is that they are the leader in their own niche market, Amorim is no exception.  Amorim reports the following market shares:

  • Cork stoppers: 25%
  • Floor and Wall Coverings: 65%
  • Composite Cork: 55%
  • Insulation Cork: 80%

In addition to being a market leader they aren't satisfied and invest in additional research and development.  Some of the current projects underway are to discover new applications for cork, research TBA in cork, and study how to remove dust from corks in wine bottles among other items.

Ownership

One last thing I want to mention is the ownership structure of the company.  An interesting point about hidden champions is that many of them aren't publicly traded.  According to the author between 6 and 9% of hidden champions trade on public exchanges.  Most are private family run companies.  Amorim blends a bit of both styles when it comes to ownership structure.

While the company trades publicly and is available for purchase to anyone with a brokerage it is 75% owned by the Amorim family through a private fund.  Various members of the family serve on the board and in executive roles.  Two other funds own stakes reducing the float to about 15% of outstanding shares.  In addition to this the company has been buying back shares in 2010 reducing the float by about 3%.

Talk to Nate about Corticeira Amorim

Disclosure: Long Corticeira Amorim.  In addition for each purchase made through the Amazon link I will receive a small commission from Amazon.  The price for the item is the same through my site as it would be if you visited Amazon.com directly.

Evaluating spinoff TNT Express

TNT Express (TNTE.Netherlands)  (TNTEY.PinkSheets)

Price: €6.92 (6/28/2011)

TNT Express is a recent spinoff from the former TNT (now called PostNL) a private mail operator in the Netherlands.  In this post I'll give a small background on the company, show a comparison with competitors, and look at catalysts for improvement.

Business Background

The Netherlands privatized mail delivery and TNT was one of the companies that filled the void.  Private mail can be thought of as two separate functions, the actual door to door mail delivery function, and parcel/freight delivery.  TNT handled both functions up to May 30th of this year, at which point it demerged the post division from the express division.

TNT Express is a worldwide parcel and freight delivery company.  The company considers themselves an integrator which the following picture depicts.  Other integrators are DHL, Fedex and UPS.

TNT Express delivers packages by truck and air.  I'm unclear if they use rail, but they might use it as UPS does which is load the trailers onto rail cars for long haul transit.

The company operates in three main segments, Europe & MEA (Middle East, Africa), Asia-Pacific, and Americas.  The company is well established in Europe & MEA, expanding in Asia, and has a growing presence in South America.  It appears that they will ship a product to North America but they don't have any direct presence.  

The revenue and EBIT breakdown by region are as follows:

As noted in the picture the Americas division is contributing a loss which is due to some execution failures in Brazil.  One catalyst which will be talked about below is a turnaround in this division.

Valuation Comparison

I've had TNT Express in my "to research" hopper for a few months with my main struggle being how to approach the valuation.  Express is a much more complex company than I usually evaluate and the company is in a market I don't know much about.  I got the idea to do a competitive analysis from this blog post.  In that post the author mimics a Benjamin Graham worksheet, I took a few modern liberties in creating my spreadsheet to show fields Ben Graham might not have had access to.

For the purposes of the spreadsheet I compared TNT Express, DHL, Fedex and UPS.  All three competitors were identified by Express as competitors who have substantially similar business models.  In addition while digging through DHL's annual report I was able to pull out a few income figures for their DHL Express division which I think are useful for comparison purposes.  I should also note, Express and DHL figures are in Euro, Fedex and UPS in dollars.  I considered converting all to Euro but deemed it unnecessary, the margin and ratio figures are currency independent and the most important.

Here is the spreadsheet:

The spreadsheet is rich with data which an investor might want to use as a starting point in looking at Express, I'm not going to go over each field but wanted to highlight a few that were important.
  • The first item is that I added in pension liabilities and operating leases to get a complete liability picture.  This is important because all of the companies except for UPS operate with a high level of operating leases.
  • Express is clearly the smallest company of the four.
  • The P/E is quite high on a TTM basis, while the company is trading almost at P/B.
  • Express has the lowest margins of all four.
  • P/FCF is a bit lower than P/E at 38.27
  • DHL's Express division is responsible for most of the profitability of DHL as a whole.  This is the reverse of PostNL and TNT Express.  Pre-demerger PostNL contributed a larger portion of profits but was in decline while TNT Express contributed a smaller amount towards earnings but growing at a faster rate.
  • UPS has an eye popping Earnings/BV ratio because they include their debt on the balance sheet.  Adjusting the other companies' BV to include operating leases would increase their Earnings/BV ratios as well.

Outlook and Catalysts


Looking at the raw stats on TNT Express doesn't exactly throw off a buy vibe to me.  Many times a spinoff creates an opportunity where the business spun off is clearly undervalued at the onset.  Other times the spinoff could hold potential if the new management is able to unlock hidden value, I believe this is the case with TNT Express.

The first catalyst is a turnaround in the Brazil operations.  The CEO has stated this is the highest priority and expects to be breakeven in 2012, and profitable in 2013.  If this happens remains to be seen, but they appear very hopeful and motivated.  I think management has the greatest incentive to turn things around now that they're standalone.  While part of PostNL the losses from Brazil weren't as large compared to the profits from the company in general, whereas now as a standalone company Brazil is having a much bigger negative influence on the accounts.

The second catalyst is that it appears part of the motivation to spin off Express was so they could be sold.  The management of TNT stated this explicitly a few times in the business press.  In addition PostNL holds a 29% stake in Express to which management has stated in they would vote yes for acquisition offers on their stake in Express.  It appears the 29% is a way for PostNL to profit if an acquisition takes place.  My suspicion is that a suitor approached them but only wanted the Express division not the entire company and a legal demerger was one way to satisfy this requirement.

The third catalyst is that the 2010 operating income, and net income were heavily influenced negatively by spinoff items.  There were €45m in demerger costs in 2010, in addition there was a €92m profit pooling loss in 2010.  The profit pooling is interesting, before the spin the Express division's profits were used to offset the German post divisions losses and while this is a legal distinction that existed in 2010 and needed to be reported on the statements it won't be continuing going forward.  This is why reading notes is so important, the pooling items appears as a small footnote, but results in 50% increase in operating income going forward.

If we take the €45m and €92m and add those back into operating income it comes out to €317m, verses the €180m reported, quite a difference.  That changes EBIT/Sales from 2.55% to 4.49% which is a much more respectable number.

Fourth catalyst management has stated they plan on paying out 40% of net income as a dividend.  On the spreadsheet I estimated this based on the 2010 dividend.  Based on the proforma EBIT the dividend would have been 9.4 eurocents a share for a 1.37% yield at today's price.  I would classify this as a very weak catalyst.

From an outlook perspective management has stated that their goal is to increase revenue from €7b to €10b by 2015.  Most of this increase is coming from a turnaround in Brazil, and growth in the Asia operations.

Summary


I've been watching Express since the first day of the spinoff when it quickly jumped to €10 and then slowly drifted down to its current price of €6.92.  While I don't think the company is a slam dunk as is, I do think there are a lot of positive catalysts which if realized could create a lot of value for Express shareholders.  I haven't pulled the trigger on a position yet, but I'm strongly considering it.  Even with the future uncertainties around the Brazil turnaround and Asian growth I think buying TNT Express at 1x book value is probably a pretty good deal.  I'd actually like DHL to spin off their express division, from what I saw I'd love to own a piece of that!

Talk to Nate about TNT Express

Disclosure: No positions in any stocks mentioned in this post.


Resources:
2010 TNT Express annual report (supplemental filing)
TNT Express website

Best of the Best

Best of the Best (BEST.UK)

Price: 16.5 GBX (6/23/2011)

Best of the Best (BofB) is a company specializing in luxury car competitions.  They display cars in airports and online and then raffle the car off.  The company offers games people can play where the user pays a small fee to enter in a chance to win a car.  Eventually someone wins the car after the cost of the car and a built in profit margin are achieved by player entries.  The company guarantees one winner a month, offers free worldwide shipping, as well as free insurance for the first year.  A sample of the cars currently offered as prizes, Aston Martin Virage Volante, Lamborghini LP560-4, Audi R8 + £20,000, Ferrari 458 Italia, Porsche GT3 RS 4.0, Mercedes Benz SLS AMG, and £100,000 cash.

Just for good measure here's a picture of me sitting in a Ferrari a few years back..

In some ways the business reminds me of Quibids which is an internet bidding company in the US.  The theory is that the consumer will be enticed by the thought of taking home a Ferrari for £50 or £100 and is willing to commit that amount of money to try and win.  Spread across thousands of people it can be a very profitable business.

The actual nature of the games is a user is shown a picture, the one I tried was of soccer players.  In the picture the ball was removed and I was instructed to pick where I thought it would be.  If I clicked multiple times it was considered multiple entries.  The coordinates of my clicks were my ticket, and if one of my coordinates was the exact coordinate of where the removed ball actually was I'd be a winner.  Apparently under UK gaming law this is considered a game of skill.  If it truly is a game of skill I'd expect to see a skilled winner appear more than once, in my quick browse of the results that doesn't appear to be the case.  Skill or not the company is in compliance and is legal in the UK.

Business Breakdown

Up until the last interim statement BofB made 2/3 of its revenue displaying cars and offering games in airports around the UK.  BofB earned 1/3 of its revenue from the online division which it has expanded recently.

The business has had strong results and remained profitable and cash flow positive for the past five years.  The question you're probably asking right now is why is the company trading so low?  The cause of the cheapness for Best of the Best's shares is very simple, in October 2010 BAA airports discontinued business with BofB stating they would like to reclaim the space previously used for car displays and games at the airports for additional seating.  BAA runs a number of British airports including London Heathrow, London Stansted, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, and Southampton airport.

This is significant for the company, two thirds of its revenue is derived from airport displays and a large section of the high traffic airport market was just shut down.  Management has stated that they are working to increase online market share as well as expand offerings at current airports.  It's unknown if this will work or not and the company next reports results in August 2011.

Valuation

The company is trading at a discount to net current assets giving it a bit of a margin of safety as it retools.  Here is the asset breakdown.


The company is sitting on a nice pile of cash, almost no receivables and inventories.  I would presume the inventories consist of the cars about to be given to winners.  The asset makeup is desirable and very liquid.  In the case of BofB I would say that the inventory doesn't need a discount.  Even at a fire sale liquidation they would probably be able to get close to book value for the luxury cars they hold.

The big question is how will the discontinued airports affect the income statement?  I went ahead and created a small pro-forma income statement based on the latest financials with three difference scenarios.  I estimate a 25%, 50% and 100% loss from the airport operations.



In all three cases the company is moved from a profit to a loss of varying degrees.  Interestingly cash conversion was an astonishing 7x net income the previous period which was helped by increased depreciation.  If the company can even convert at 2x they could post positive cash flow for a 25% decline, and a small dip into cash for a 50% decline.  

The company is sitting on £2,647,000 of cash which it plans on using as it tries to increase its online presence and open new airport outlets.

Bottom Line

Best of the Best is trading at a nice discount to NCAV and has a history of sizable profitability in the past.  The company has hit a sizable bump in the road and it's very uncertain if they will be able to increase the online business or gain new outlets.  One thing on the investor's side is that 64% of the company is held by two directors which gives them motivation to turn operations around.  In addition to management's strong motivation an investor has a sizable margin of safety to await the turn around.

I'm not making any investments at this time but I'm going to keep the company on my radar and wait for the next results in August.

Talk to Nate about Best of the Best

Disclosure: No position